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INTRODUCTION

In the last twenty-five years, economic analysis in antitrust law has
primarily served to validate much corporate conduct that the courts had
previously viewed with great suspicion and often declared illegal. 1 As a
result of the recent trend, many legal barriers to business behavior have
been relaxed,2 and some complain,3 eliminated altogether. 4 Nevertheless, economic reasoning enables the courts to gain a more sophisticated
1. See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, "What Never? Well Hardly Ever'': Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as
an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASfINGS L.J. 471, 484 (1987) ("During the late

1970s, the expansion of the application of per se rules came to an abrupt halt."); Eleanor M. Fox,

The Politics ofLaw and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as Window, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 554, 566-67 (1986) (criticizing the move toward efficiency analysis in interpreting the antitrust
laws as not following Congressional intent); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84
MICH. L. REv. 213, 217·18 (1985) (asserting that antitrust law has always used economics, but the
economics used by policymakers in the late 1970s and early 1980s was radically different from prior
economic models); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule ofReason Approaches to
Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 685, 686 (1991) ("As the Efficiency Model has won over more
Supreme Court and lower federal court judges in the past ten years, the per se rule has been applied
less frequently, and the rule of reason has achieved a dominant role in antitrust analysis.").
2. For example, see the antitrust treatment of the following practices: vertical non· price reo
straints, see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (using economic analy·
sis favoring interbrand competition over intrabrand competition to overrule Court's previous
holding in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), that a manufacturer's non·
price restrictions on its retailers to intrabrand competition with respect to the manufacturer's prod·
uct were per se illegal); predatory pricing, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986) (upholding summary judgment for defendants on basis of economic argument
that predatory pricing was an unprofitable business strategy and was therefore not a viable explana.
tion for price discounting behavior by firms); tying arrangements, see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No.2. v. Hyde, 466 U.s. 2 (1984) (engaging in an economic analysis to conclude that the conduct
before them does not constitute a tying arrangement for antitrust purposes, and Justice O'Connor, in
an opinion concurring in judgment, arguing in favor of abandoning per se rulings for tying arrange·
ments and applying instead a rule of reason approach that would incorporate economic reasoning);
concerted refusals to deal and group boycotts, see Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
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and complex understanding of the marketplace, and allows them to discern competitive forces not readily apparent under more traditional analyses of corporate activities. 5
The focus of modem applications of economic reasoning to antitrust
concerns has been on the more subtle efficiency or procompetitive dimensions of the scrutinized conduct. 6 When any of these characteristics are
discovered, the courts tend to find no antitrust violation. There are two
major difficulties with this approach. First, efficiency or pro competitive
aspects can almost always be uncovered in any corporate enterprise, creating the potential for legitimizing almost all business behavior.7 Second,
the legal conclusions courts reach are typically couched in terms of the
business practice itself;8 therefore, once upheld, that practice is validated
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (limiting the applicability of per se illegality to those
instances of exclusive market power, and upholding the practice under rule of reason principles
because refusal to deal does not necessarily result in anticompetitive effects); and vertical price restraints, see Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (using the economic
arguments of interbrand-intrabrand competition to justify limiting those circumstances in which per
se illegal vertical price restraints can be found).
3. See. e.g., Ian Shapiro, Richard Posner's Praxis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 999 (1987). But see Richard A. Posner, On Theory and Practice: Reply to 'Richard Posner's Praxis,' 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077
(1989).
4. See infra note 93 (discussing the courts' treatment of exclusive dealerships).
5. The courts have used several concepts over the last 15 years that have developed from
economic theory: (1) interbrand competition, see Continental T. V., 433 U.S. at 36; Business Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. at 717; infra notes 48,59-60 and aecompanying text; (2) contestable market theory,
see Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 574; Barry Wright Corp. v. ITI Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d
227 (1st Cir. 1983); infra notes 56, 101-02 and accompanying text; (3) the necessity of restraints to
pennit the existence of certain markets, see NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1985); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
8. The Court's predilection for constructing its rulings in terms of the conduct, abstracted
from the market context, can be seen in both categories of antitrust analyses: the per se rules and the
rule of reason approach. It is evident that rules of per se illegality are strictly in terms of the conduct. u[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
[per se] illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,5 (1958). The Court also
tends to focus its holdings on the conduct even when it engages in a rule of reason analysis that may
include an evaluation of the market to assist it in reaching its conclusion:
[T]he rule of reason requires the factfinder to decide whether under all the circumstances of
the case the restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition.
. . . Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict
with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable.
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982). For a further examination of this phenomenon, sec infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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for most of the spectrum of marketplace scenarios. 9 Although thus far
the more permissive antitrust treatment accorded many restraints has
been warranted, the danger is that continued application of economic
analysis in this manner will lead to indiscriminate validations of a wide
variety of business practices. lO In addition, many practices will be permitted in an excessively broad range of contexts, some of which, when
assessed by more refined economic standards, could prove to have serious
anticompetitive ramifications. II
It is time therefore for the Court to use economic analysis in the
antitrust arena in a different way.I2 The Court must develop a new
methodology for evaluating marketplace scenarios-one that will allow it
to make determinations more consistent with the objectives of the antitrust laws. I3 In this Article, I propose just such a new analytic framework, one that emphasizes context rather than conduct, thereby avoiding
9. See, e.g., infra note 90 (discussing the courts' treatment of communication of prices and
costs of production among competitors).
10. The Court's narrowing the possibility of finding per se illegal vertical price-fixing to preserve the possibility of procompetitive vertical non-price-fixing has certainly raised the question of
whether anticompetitive vertical price-fixing will escape antitrust condemnation altogether. See i,,fra note 73.
11. The Court's treatment of predatory pricing in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), makes it almost impossible to find that the practice has occurred. The
Court based its conclusion on the economic theory, espoused by the Chicago School, that predatory
pricing is an unprofitable strategy and will therefore rarely occur. Although the issue has frequently
been debated within economic circles, recent developments in economic theory indicate that predatory pricing is more viable than previously believed. See infra note 58. Yet the Court's reasoning in
Matsushita makes it unlikely that such activity will be condemned.
12. A number of scholars have offered new perspectives on the use of economics in antitrust
laws. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals ofAntitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare,
and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020 (1987); Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective.' Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?,
62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 936 (1987); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L.
REv. 1 (1989); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Piraino, supra note 1.
13. The debate as to the true objectives of the Sherman Act and antitrust law in general is well
documented. Is the aim to preserve markets for competitors, or is it to maximize consumer welfare?
Is the maximization of consumer welfare the same as promoting economie efficiency?
Some commentators view the antitrust laws as a means to ensure a form of economic democracy, that is, to avoid concentration of economic power, to preserve access and presence of other
competitors in any particular market and to maintain an equitable distribution of income and
wealth. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1140 (1981); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1051 (1979). Others argue for an efficiency criterion as the sole goal so as to maximize consumer
welfare. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTrrRusr PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 51
(1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTlTRusr LAW: AN EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 18-22 (1976). Still
others take positions in-between. See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTlTRUsr
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUsr PRINCIPLES AND THEIR ApPLICATION ~~ 103-113 (1978).
There is also disagreement over the correct measure of efficiency and what it means to maximize
consumer welfare.

Vol. 41:1045]

CONDUCT AND CONTEXT IN ANTITRUST

1049

the danger of upholding business practices in dubious circumstances. I
demonstrate the efficacy of this model through an antitrust theory of
countervailing power,14 a theory that can be gleaned from five Supreme
Court cases that span the history of antitrust law since the passage of the
Sherman Act.lS
The countervailing power analysis that I suggest here focuses on the
phenomenon of the questionable restraint of trade. that emerges in response to an already existing market power that, although legal, nonetheless adversely affects the parties engaging in the challenged conduct. 16
Even when such restraints conflict with traditional antitrust principles,
my countervailing power analysis upholds their legality, although only in
circumscribed and well-delineated circumstances. Unlike the economic
approaches that the courts now use (which can lead to overlegitimization), countervailing power analysis is discrete-upholding restraints
only in contexts that are truly competitive and in society's interest to
maintain. Furthermore, it offers guidelines of salient characteristics that
the Court should look for to ensure that the market examined is and will
remain truly competitive.
In Part I of this Article, I characterize the four antitrust philosophies that have prevailed on the Court during this century and show how
the economists' atomistic model has provided the basis for all four approaches. Part II delineates the problematic methodology, developed
from the atomistic model, that underlies the Court's current use of economic reasoning and the danger that the methodology creates. In Part
III, I suggest an alternative theoretical framework for engaging in economic analysis of antitrust concerns. In that context, I propose a new
methodology for evaluating horizontal restraints, which I call countervailing power analysis. Finally, Part IV demonstrates the value and importance of an antitrust theory of countervailing power.
As the debates have continued, the role of economics as an analytic tool seems to have receded
to the background. One of the purposes of this Article is to join with a growing miuority and help
bring to the forefront once again the power that economic analysis has to make distinctions between
competitive and anticompetitive conduct. That awareness of power seems to have faded in much of
the discussion of whether and to what extent economics has a place in antitrust law.
14. I take my lead from John Kenneth Galbraith. See JOHN K. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITAUSM: THE CoNCEPT OF COUNTERVAIUNG POWER 123 (1952) ("[Countervailing power's] development, in response to positions of market power, is pervasive in the economy.... The way in which
countervailing power operates in these markets is worth examining in some detail."). To my knowledge, no one has applied countervailing power analysis directly to antitrust law.
15. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 596 (1972); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
16. See infra notes 115-55 and accompanying text.
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JUDICIAL NOTIONS OF COMPETITION

The Atomistic Model

The predominant economic image that underlies the antitrust analyses of differing judicial perspectives mirrors the atomistic model of competition. The atomistic model,17 developed by economists, serves both
positive and normative functions. IS It describes an economic scenario
consisting of a large number of buyers and sellers, none of whom can
individually affect the market price or output. The model explains how
the market forces of competition drive the individual sellers to produce
output at the least cost to themselves and to society, and to sell the goods
at a price commensurate with those costs. Because of this market pricing
mechanism, sellers are also induced to produce goods according to the
desires of consumers. Thus the sellers are inclined to operate efficiently
and in a manner that maximizes social welfare.
As the atomistic model explains, these production decisions arise
directly from the fact that the sellers have no control over market price.
Therefore, the only way the sellers can be sure to enhance their profits is
to lower production costs. If increased sales will also serve to increase
profits, then the sellers must compete with each other for customers,
17. The Atomistic School reflects a perspective of the marketplace that originated with French
economists in the nineteenth century and was later adopted by Adam Smith for his "invisible hand"
characterization of market structure. See ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); THE NEW
PALGRAVE, A DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS (John Eatwell et aI. eds., 1987). Until the last two
decades, the atomistic model has been the primary focus in the development of economic analysis. It
portrays the market as consisting of many independent competitors whose behavior is analogized to
the functioning of atoms. Although these competitors cannot by themselves control any facet of the
marketplace, their interactions determine the outcome of the market. Such markets are typically
described as ones of perfect or pure competition; the competitors are referred to as price-takers (as
opposed to price-setters, such as monopolists). For analyses of perfeet competition in single markets,
see DAVID M. KREPS, A CoURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1990); EDMOND MALINVAUD,
LECTURES ON MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1972); HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(2d ed. 1984). For analyses of perfect competition for the economy as a whole (known as general
equilibrium analysis), see, in addition to the references above, KENNETH J. ARROW & F.H. HAHN,
GENERAL CoMPETITIVE ANALYSIS (1971); GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE: AN AxIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF EcONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (1959); TJALLING C. KOOPMANS, THREE EsSAYS
ON THE STATE OF EcONOMIC SCIENCE (1957). The determination that an entire economy could
achieve price and output equilibrium when it contained an infinite number of markets with each
consisting of iunumerable buyers and sellers was one of the major accomplishments of economic
theory in the third quarter of this century. For a less mathematical treatment of these subjects, see
HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN ApPROACH (2d ed. 1990). See
also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 1-49 (1985); F.M.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1990).
18. See KOOPMANS, supra note 17, at viii ("The descriptive theory of competitive equilibrium
..• and the normative theory of the use of prices for efficient allocation of resources appear as two
sides of one coin."); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, EssAYS IN PosmVE ECONOMICS 3-43 (1953);
JOAN ROBINSON, EcONOMIC PHILOSOPHY (1962); Paul A. Samuelson, Discussion on Problems of
Methodology, AM. EcON. REV., May i963, at 231-36.
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which in tum requires them to increase quality and lower sales prices.
Accomplishing those goals generally demands reduction in production
costs as well. 19 Because lower prices and increased quality of goods are
socially desirable, emulating the atomistic structure has been viewed as
the ideal way to achieve those ends. 20
Enterprises can, however, subvert the atomistic process at the expense of the consumers through certain restraints of trade. A classic example is an agreement among competitors to raise prices above market
levels to enhance business profits. The agreement prevents the market
from determining price levels and turns that control over to the combination of competitors. 21 To prevent such conduct, in 1890 the Sherman
Act was passed. 22
19. See supra note 17. Theoretically, once firms reach profit-maximizing levels of output, given
their cost structure, they no longer have an incentive to compete for additional customers. Because
costs are presumed to rise as production expands beyond a certain point, production in excess of
profit-maximizing levels of output implies that the increased costs would exceed the increased revenue and thereby diminish profit levels already achieved. If, however, new cost-savings techniques
are discovered and their full exploitation requires an expansion in sales that, as a result, will further
enhance profits, then competition for customers would continue.
20. See. e.g., JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CoNSEQUENCES IN MANUFAcruRING INDUSTRIES (1956). Debates over how to measure whether a
given market succeeds in the atomistic emulation abound. See. e.g., INDUSTRIAL CoNCENTRATION:
THE NEW LEARNING (Harvey J. Goldschmidt et aI. eds., 1974); Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law &
Economics. and the Courts, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1987, at 181. Krattenmaker &
Salop, supra note 12; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REv. 937 (1981); Richard Schmalensee et aI., Landes and Posner on Market Power: Four
Responses, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1787 (1981) (debating the proper measure of monopoly power). For
case law advocating the atomistic structure, see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978):
The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce
not only lower prices, but also better goods and services..•. The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements
of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and durability-and not just the immediate cost, are
favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.
[d. at 695; see also Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (discussed infra note 44).
21. See. e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) ("The aim and
result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. The
power to fix prices ••. involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable
prices."); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) ("Those who controlled the prices would control or effectively dominate the market."); see also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS EcONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
71-145 (1988); Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcement Collusion,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 295 (1987).
22. See 21 CONGo REc. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (''The purpose of this bill is to
enable the courts of the United States to apply the same remedies against combinations which injuriously affect the interests of the United States that have been applied in the several states to protect
local interests."); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933) ("The purpose
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to prevent undue restraints of interstate commerce, to maintain its
appropriate freedom in the public interest, to afford protection from the subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic endeavor.").
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Since the passage of the Sherman Act, the courts, even if not formally invoking the atomistic model, have been influenced by whether the
conduct of the parties before them significantly deviates from the atomistic image. Thus, the courts have typically focused on the extent to which
a large number of sellers are still competing with each other. When the
courts find the number sufficiently large, they tend to uphold the business
practice in question. 23 Conversely, as the number of competitive sellers
decreases, the courts are more likely to condemn the conduct as unreasonably impairing competition. 24 The quantity of sellers is not always
dispositive, however; the courts also consider the context in which the
restraint operates. 25 If the courts discover enough procompetitive or efficiency gains, the business practice in question is likely to be upheld, even
if there is some deviation from the atomistic framework. These deviations in structure are permitted because the courts believe the firm's production decisions are the same as if it were operating in an atomistic
enviroument,26 The extent to which courts allow deviations from the
atomistic model varies with the philosophy guiding them.
B. Antitrust Perspectives of the Supreme Court
Scholars typically treat the variety of conflicting antitrust perspectives as divisible into two groups, although there is no agreement as to
how that division should be made. One suggested division is to distinguish between populist and efficiency analyses;27 another is to contrast
antitrust views by whether they support the goals of economic democracy or of the Chicago School. 28 Sometimes the two groupings are characterized by whether they advocate intervention or laissez-faire
efficiency. Whatever characterization is chosen, however, the scholarly
critiques, evaluations, and debates on antitrust issues seem to grind to a
halt in part because the Court's opinions do not fall neatly under one or
the other chosen heading. This failing is because there have been more
23. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Fortner II), 429 U.S. 610
(1977); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
24. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
25. Beginning in the 19305, however, some courts were preoccupied with the quantity of buyers
and seIlers, and refused to consider other economic dimensions that would keep the market competitive. Only when it was determined that a sufficient number of competitors existed were those courts
assured that competition was preserved. I characterize such courts as subscribing to the Modem
Populist philosophy. See infra text accompanying notes 40-45.
26. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. I (1979); United
States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
27. See 1 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, at 7-33.
28. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REv. 917, 917-18
(1987).
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than two antitrust perspectives influencing the Court. In fact, one can
divide the antitrust philosophies followed by the Supreme Court into
four schools: Intuitive Atomistic, Modem Populist, Modem Market,
and Chicago School. Because the influence of these philosophies overlaps in time, one can observe the Court in a given period being guided by
different approaches in making its antitrust determinations. In recent
times, the Court has seemed to be at war with itself, fluctuating from one
decision to the next between the philosophies of different schools.29
What primarily distinguishes one school from another is the type of
and extent to which each engages in economic reasoning. The characteristic they share is that they base their decisions on factors that are consistent with the economists' atomistic model of the marketplace.
1. The Intuitive Atomistic School. The Intuitive Atomistic
School, as I call it, prevailed in the first third of this century.30 It was a
reaction to two competing approaches within the theory of political economy regarding the regulation of business conduct. One group, the Populists, wanted to preserve a large number of sellers; the second group was
willing to sacrifice the quantity of sellers to foster production efficiency
29. Compare. for example. the Court's Modem Populist analysis in Fortner Enters. v. United
States Steel Corp. (Fortner 1).394 U.S. 495 (1969). with its Modem Market approach. see infra note
44. in United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters. (Fortner 11). 429 U.S. 610 (1977). In Fortner I.
the Court established guidelines that essentially dictated that. on remand. the conduct under scrutiny would be held in violation of the Sherman Act. See Fortner I. 394 U.S. at 501-03. When the
lower court obliged and the case once again reached the Supreme Court on appeal in Fortner II. the
majority then applied a Modem Market analysis. looking more to the competitive context than to
the restraint itself. and reversed the lower court by upholding the business practice. See Fortner II.
429 U.S. at 620-21. The Court reverted to its Modem Populist perspective in Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medieal Soc'y. 457 U.S. 332 (1982). but then adopted Modem Market standards when ruling in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp .• 465 U.S. 752 (1984). For a discussion of the Modem
Populist and Modem Market approaches. see infra text accompanying notes 40-45 and notes 46-66.
respectively.
30. The earliest decisions reflecting an Intuitive Atomistic approach are also those that first
applied a rule of reason standard. The purpose of the rule of reason approach was to permit the
courts to consider overall market dynamics, and not just the conduct itself. when ascertaining
whether the market remained competitive. The incorporation of a market analysis to address antitrust concerns set the stage for the development of the Intuitive Atomistic philosophy. In particular.
Justice White's opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). viewed as the first
statement of rule of reason analysis, incorporated a strong sense of the economics of the marketplace
in the proposed assessment of business conduct. Although Justice White acknowledged that some
restraints were inherently anticompetitive (thereby opening the door to per se illegality). he asserted
that what was offoremost importance was to determine whether competition in the marketplace as a
whole was undermined before declaring a restraint illegal. See id. at 55-65; see also United States v.
Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922) (barring defendant railroad from purchasing another
railroad when the effect was to suppress the free flow of competition): United States v. United States
Steel Corp .• 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (finding defendant subject to too much vigorous competition for
there to be anticompetitive effects from its conduct).

1054

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:1045

gains through economies of scale. 31 The Court in this era responded to
these views primarily by supporting the Populists' concerns, but tempered this approach with a market analysis to measure the efficiencies
created-'and to: gauge the extent to which competitive forces were still
effective. 32
Engaging in a comparatively primitive form of economic analysis,33
the Court tended to look at the extent of improvements in the quality and
cost of production, and, where relevant, the extent to which prices, output, and the flow of commerce were restrained. So, for example, the
Court examined whether the restraint fostered product standardization
and improved distribution,34 whether it increased access to information
and markets among buyers and sellers,35 and what percentage of the
market was affected by the restraint either in time or scope. 36 If the restraints were sufficiently limited and the improvements reasonably significant, the Court tended to find for the defendant;37 otherwise, it would

31. For historical analyses of these two competing views, see BORK, supra note 13, at 3-160;
ELEANOR M. Fox & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 22-98
(1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68
TEX. L. REv. 105 (1989).
32. See, e.g., Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921) (discussed infra at
notes 36-37); United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859 (D. Md. 1916), appeal dismissed, 256
U.S. 706 (1921) (discussed infra at notes 34, 37 and accompanying text).
33. In this era, cconomic analysis itself was at an early stage of development. It had not yet
reached the level of sophistication and depth of understanding of corporate conduct afforded by the
innovation of mathematical techniques in the Modem Market period. See infra note 55. Thus the
courts were limited to looking at the more salient aspeets of business practices and the extent to
which they resembled the atomistic model. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act
and the Classic Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REv. 1019 (1989) (discussing the manner in
which changes in economic ideology have affected judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act).
34. See American Can Co., 230 F. at 894.
35. See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); United States
v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); American Column & Lumber v. United States,
257 U.S. 377, 413-19 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Eastern States Retail
Lnmber Dcalers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). Compare Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921) (holding that the communication and cooperation between manufactnrer and dealer as to resale price was too limited in scope to affect competition overall) with FTC
v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (holding that the manufacturer's efforts to ensure
that suggested resale prices were adhered to were too far-reaching and suppressed price
competition).
37. The Conrt, for example, upheld the manufacturer's communication of a price floor to dealers in Frey & Son, see 256 U.S. at 210-11; the consolidation of can manufacturers that took advantage of economies of scale in American Can Co., see 230 F. at 903-04; and the communication of
summary sales data that enabled manufacturers to avoid costly inventory build-up in Maple Flooring, see 268 U.S. at 567.
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condemn the scrutinized practice. 38 Although economists were still developing the atomistic model,39 in this period the Court was intuitively
using aspects of that economic depiction of the marketplace to determine
whether the real-world conduct at issue violated the goals of the Sherman Act.

2. The Modern Populist School. The Modern Populist School
emerged in the early 1930s and still holds sway over some Justices on the
Court today.40 It fully embraced the economists' now well-formed atomistic model. Ironically, however, even though the Justices who adhered
to the Modern Populist philosophy formally turned to economics for guidance (including the use of statistical analysis to assess market structure),41 they applied the atomistic model so rigidly as to preclude any
38. In American Linseed Oil Co., the Court found that the requirement of the association of
manufacturers (comprised of members covering a broad geographical area) that its members report
specific details of their prices to which they had to adhere violated the Sherman Act. See 262 U.S. at
390. In Beech-Nut Packing Co., the Court held that the scheme of price communication and enforcement was too extensive and therefore anticompetitive. See 257 U.S. at 455.
39. See sources cited supra note 31.
40. In recent years, the strongest adherents of the Modem Populist approach on the Court have
been Justices Brennan and Marshall. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 71 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.) (objecting to the use of efficiency
analysis to uphold restraints on intrabrand competition). With their resignations, the only Justices
on the Court who seem to be influenced by the Modem Populist approach are Justices Stevens and
White. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 736 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (decrying majority's refusal to focus on the distinction between "naked restraints" and
"ancillary restraints" because of its focus on the distinction between "vertical nonprice restraints"
and "vertical price restraints"); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 601-04
(1986) (White, J., dissenting) (objecting to the majority's use of economic theory to conclude that
predatory pricing could not exist in the case before it).
41. In the early years of the Modem Populist era, courts tended to focus on whether the defendants were engaging iu conduct that seemed, at least on the surface, to exclude atomistic competition by eliminating some of the players in the marketplace. See, for example, United States v. First
Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930), in which a group of film distributors established local credit
committees to determine the financial reliability oflocal theaters to curtail the theater owners' widespread practice of breaching contracts. The distributors agreed not to deal with any theater owner
who refused to provide credit information, and, when theater ownership was transferred, not to deal
with any owner who refused to honor the theater's contracts. The lower court had upheld the
practice because it circumvented fraudulent trade practices and induced performance of contracts.
See United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 34 F.2d 815, 818-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). Justice McReynolds overruled the lower court and held the arrangement unlawful on the ground that it "exclud[ed theater owners] from the opportunity to deal in a free and untrammeled market." First Nat'l
Pictures, 282 U.S. at 54.
In the 1960s and 1970s the Court embraced economics more formally when it adopted the
"structure-conduct-performance" analysis being developed by certain industrial organization economists-known as the "structuralists." This perspective evaluated the competitiveness of the marketplace by engaging in extensive data analysis to see whether, among other factors, the defendants'
profit performance or the level of concentration in the industry was inconsistent with what the atomistic model would predict. Defeudants' conduct would be condemned if the evidence showed undue
deviation from the atomistic norm. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
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economic analysis that did not focus solely on whether the business behavior deviated from that paradigm.42 As a result, no economic evaluations of the efficiency gains achieved or the degree of competitiveness
actually existing in the marketplace were entertained.43 Quite frequently,
if a restraint enhanced product quality or lowered costs by enabling a
(1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.s. 294 (1962). For excellent expositions and analyses of the structuralist era, see Kenneth G. Elzinga, Unmasking Monopoly: Four Types ofEconomic
Evidence, in EcONOMICS & ANTITRUST POLICY 11, 14 (Robert 1. Lamer & lames W. Meehan, Ir.
eds., 1989); lames Meehan, Ir. & Robert Lamer, The Structural Schoo/, Its Critics and Its Progeny:
An Assessment, in EcONOMICS & ANTITRUST POLICY, supra, at 179; Timothy Waters, Antitrust Law
and Policy: Rule ofLaw or Economic Assumptions?, in EcONOMICS & ANTITRUST POLICY, supra, at
151.
42. The Court in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), for example, made it
clear that it viewed the purpose of the antitrust statutes as that of preventing economic concentrations by ensuring the existence of many small competitors in the American economy. See id. at 276.
In American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), one of the first opinions
to augur the Modern Populist approach, the Court focused solely on the danger of horizontal pricefixing that might arise from the communication of price and cost information among trade association members. See id. at 411-12. It completely disregarded the fact that there were 400 membersan nnwieldy number to form a workable price agreement-and that the information would prevent
the members, most of whom were small businessmen, from making inefficient business decisions by
keeping them informed of market conditions. The Court also iguored the competItion the association itself faced because it represented only one-third of total industrial production. The intense
competitive forces rendered ineffective any anticompetitive impacts arising from the association's
information dissemination. Although not Supreme Court eases, the two classic opinions often cited
by the Court that exemplify the inflexible application of the atomistic standard are United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am. (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), and United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), both of
which are discussed further infra note 43.
43. In ALCOA, the court criticized the defendant for seizing every opportunity to expand its
productive capacity (thereby making it more difficult for other firms to enter the industry), particularly when the defendant anticipated a future increase in demand. See 148 F.2d at 430-31. ludge
Learned Hand did not seem to appreciate that, given the time required to build a new plant and
purchase equipment and machinery, it was in society's interest to have aluminum production already
available when demand increased rather than to suffer through periods of aluminum shortages while
the market adjusted. The court also accused ALCOA of "price-squeezing," that is, selling aluminum ingot to sheet-rollers at such a high price that the sheet-rollers could not match ALCOA's own
rolled sheet price, resnlting in the independents being driven out of business. See id. at 436. ludge
Hand apparently did not realize that the only explanation for the "price-squeeze" that was consistent with maximizing profits was that ALCOA must have been able to roll sheet metal for a lower
cost than the independent sheet rollers, resulting in greater profits than would be realized from
selling the ingot alone. If that were not the ease, then ALCOA would have been selling its aluminum in rolled sheets for a lower net profit than it could have earned from selling ingots to the sheetrollers without going into the sheet-rolling business altogether, and that would have been an unprof·
itable business decision.
ludge Wyzanski, in United Shoe, also seemed unaware of the competitive advantages of the
activities he criticized. He did not like the fact that United Shoe provided free repairs for its equipment, see 110 F. Supp. at 325, because that closed the market to independent repair services; the
modern day automobile owner can clcarly see the advantages to the consumer of such an arrangement. He also attacked United Shoe's practice of leasing rather than selling their equipment, and
argued that leasing tied purchasers to United Shoe for a longer period of time, thereby precluding
other makers of shoe-manufacturing equipment from reaching those customers. See id at 324-25.
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proportion of sellers to operate in concert, the practice was still condemned and in some cases declared per se illegal, even though the majority of the market was competing effectively with the groUp.44
The Modem Populist School was therefore primarily concerned
with the mere presence of combinations and restraints without regard to
any other economic consequences. Although the Modem Populist
School is unidimensional in outlook, its impact on the development of
antitrust law has been quite significant and has resulted in severe curtailments of pennissible business practices. In particular, this philosophy
was responsible for the Court's development of the majority of the rules
of per se illegality,4S in contrast to the earlier Intuitive Atomistic Court's
emphasis on a rule of reason approach.
His conclusion is not only dubious, but it ignores the enhancement to competition that leasing creates. A lease term can be no longer than the life of the equipment, and a lessor can break a lease, at
some cost, to switch to a preferred product, just as readily as a purchaser can sell equipment, at a
loss, to purchase a new brand. In either ease, a customer can, for a price, terminate its use of the
equipment and will do so if the new equipment is sufficiently more profitable. Furthermore, potential shoe manufacturers are more likely to enter the business if their initial capital outlays involve
only the expense of leasing equipment rather than the cost of a purchase. As a result, more shoe
manufacturers will be in business, stimulating competition both in the shoe industry and in the shoemanufacturing equipment industry.
Neither Judge Hand nor Judge Wyzanski considered the competitive or efficiency advantages of
the activities they criticized. Instead, they were both concerned with the extent to which the conduct, in the most immediate sense, caused the market structure to sway from the atomistic
paradigm.
44. In Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980), the Court declared per se illegal
an agreement among beer wholesalers not to extend free short-term credit to their customer retailers.
Because the agreement could have an indirec! impact on price, it was viewed as a form of illegal
price-fixing. See id. at 650. The Court explicitly refused to consider the view of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the agreement might actually enhance price competition and therefore should be considered under a rule of reason evaluation. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.,
605 F.2d 1097, 1099 (9th eir. 1979).
In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the majority examined the seller's
requirement that purchasers of its land agree to use the seller'S railroad services if they were the
lowest priced. The Court ruled that the restriction was a per se illegal tying arrangement. See id. at
7. The Court held that the level of market dominance required was not "anything more than sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied product
(assuming all the time, of course, that a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce is affected)." ld. at 11. Although the facts were sparse, the dissent questioned the majority's conclusion
that the seller had market dominance because indications were that the seller owned less than five
percent of the land in any given area. See id. at 16 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The lack of market
power indicates that the seller was subject to competitive forces and could not have unreasonably
foreclosed any part of the market.
45. Of the five categories of per se illegal restraints, four were created by Modern Populist
Courts: horizontal price-fixing, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
tying arrangements, see International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); group boycotts,
see IGor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); and horizontal market divisions,
see United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). See also Beschle, supra note 1, at 477-98
(reviewing the Court's expansion of per se illegal rules).
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3. The Modern Market School. As society became more sophisticated about the advantages and disadvantages of concentrated corporate
conduct,46 the judicial door opened to increasingly comprehensive and
complex economic analyses that permitted courts to evaluate better the
impact of business behavior on market structure and consumer welfare. 47
A new philosophy of economic analysis emerged that made its first tentative appearance in the judicial arena in the mid-19,60s,48 gained momentum in the 1970s,49 and blossomed in the 1980s.50 Although the
relationship is not readily apparent, the Modem Market School is also
primarily based on the atomistic model because it measures defendants'
conduct by the extent to which they act as if they are in an atomistic
world. 51
46. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13; GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY (1968); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTI·
TRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). Some observe that mainstream America's new sophistication may
have been economically motivated. See Fox & Sullivan, supra note 12, at 945 ("As the American
economy slumped in the late 1970s, the pressure for change increased.").
47. See Einer R. Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REv. 667 (1991).
48. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (considering the possibility
that interbrand competition could limit the anticompetitive effects of restraints on intrabrand
competition).
49. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
(upholding blanket licensing agreements offered by two agencies, effectively setting prices for all
composers and musical performers in the country, on the ground that the licensing arrangement
created a market for the members that could not exist before because of high transaction costs);
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (invalidating a price
restraint on the ground that the marketplace should take care to preserve the quality of services that
the restraint was designed to protect).
50. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985) (finding no group boycott because organization promoted efficiency and did not have
market power to generate predominately anticompetitive effects); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468
U.S. 85 (1984) (refusing to apply per se illegality rule where product would not exist but for the
horizontal restraints); Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 970 (1981) (declaring the defendant's requirement of both lease and franchise agreement part of
an overall business marketing strategy and therefore not a tying arrangement).
51. The role of the atomistic paradigm is obvious when a Modern Market court draws its analy·
ses from Chicago School positions, because the Chicago School derives its arguments from price
theory, which itself is premised on an atomistic framework. See, for example, the Court's adoption
in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1937), of the Chicago School argument
justifying non·price vertical restraints on the ground that they can promote interbrand competition.
For a Chicago School expositor of this position, sec Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the
Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competi·
tion Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975). See also Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 928·33 (1979). Other recent developments in economics
on topics such as strategic behavior, technological innovation, and advertising, although more com·
plex in their analyses, still ultimately gauge the conduct's validity by whether it fosters or subverts
atomistic conduct. See Thomas J. Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of
Nonfungible Goods, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1625 (1987); Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An
Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981); Thomas
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Like the Intuitive Atomistic School, the Modern Market School
looks to the procompetitive and efficiency gains of a particular restraint. 52 The Modern Market School, however, draws on more highpowered modern economic reasoning. 53 In contrast to the Modern Populist School, the Modern Market School tends to rely more on a theoretical economic approach for its legal assessments and less on the extensive
and burdensome empirical data studies used by its predecessor. 54 The
Modern Market approach evolved concurrently with an explosion in economic theory that explained the more subtle aspects of competition
among industrial organizations. For example, economists have advanced
theories about the strategic behavior of corporations concerning product
pricing, bundling of goods and services, and technological innovation.
These theories demonstrate that many business strategies that appear to
be potentially unreasonable restraints of trade are in fact the very means
by which firms compete with each other. 55 Similarly, an economic theory of contestable markets explains how a corporation can still be subject
to competitive forces even when it is the sole firm in an industry: A lone
manufacturer will still produce and price goods competitively as long as
there is the threat of potential entry by competitors. 56
These deeper understandings of corporate conduct have led the
Court to adapt legal theories consistent with the more comprehensive
market analyses emerging in the economics arena. The result has been
judicial acceptance of business practices that previously would have been
G. Salop, New Theories of Anticompetitive Exclusion, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 57 (1987); Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271 (1987).

52. See supra notes 49-50.
53. The Modern Market School has looked below the surface to uncover the efficiency and
procompetitive dimensions. The Intuitive Atomistic School looked at the percentage of the market
restrained or the obvious cost savings generated by the conduct to measure competitive and efficiency effects. When judges point out that tied goods can create economies of scale and efficiently
resolve problems of imperfect information as to quality of service, see Jefferson Parrish Hosp. Dist.
No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 44-45 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring), they are applying a more subtle
and sophisticated perception of the workings of the market than was available in the Intuitive Atomistic era.
54. See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 222-23 ("[A]ntitrust policy makers did not first discover
economic theory in the last decade. More accurately, they changed theories.").
55. The major developments in the field of industrial organization in the last 20 years are captured in a series of essays by the leading economists from around the world in the HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). The two-volume edition is the tenth installment of the HANDBOOKS IN EcONOMICS series edited by Nobel Prize
winner Kenneth J. Arrow and Michael D. Intriligator. For an excellent and highly accessible review
surveying the key subjects and placing them in historical context, see Robert H. Porter, A Review
Essay on Handbook of Industrial Organization, 29 J. EcON. LITERATURE 553 (1991).
56. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
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treated as unlawful. 57 For example, the Court now acknowledges that
firms may engage in price discounting to introduce new technology or to
open new markets, an activity treated in the past as illegal predatory
pricing. 58 Similarly, the Court also permits intrabrand non-price restraints to promote interbrand competition (which it now considers the
more efficient goal);59 previously such intrabrand non-price restraints
were declared per se illegal as a derivative form of price fixing. 60
The changes in substantive standards have also been accompanied
and bolstered by significant shifts in the burdens of proof. Thus, since
the Modem Market philosophy's ascendancy on the Court, it is now generally accepted that evidence of any procompetitive or efficiency gains
shifts to the plaintiff the burden of establishing that the anticompetitive
effects override those benefits. 61 Moreover, in contrast to the more balanced approach of the Intuitive Atomistic Court, under the Modern

57. See Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future,
75 CAL. L. REv. 959 (1987); Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75
CAL. L. REv. 983 (1987).
58. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986). For scholarly debates
regarding the efficacy and reality of predatory pricing, see Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 0/ the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697
(1975); James D. Hurwitz & William E. Kovacic, Judicial Analysis 0/ Predation: The Emerging
Trends, 35 VAND. L. REv. 63 (1982); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. LAW &
EcON. 289 (1980); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and WeI/are Analysis, 87
YALE L.J. 284 (1977). Although throughout the last decade one widely held view in economics has
been that predatory pricing is not a viable strategy and that deep price discounting by firms is likely
to be the result of procompetitive efforts, recent economic analysis suggests that there arc some
scenarios in which pricing policies by firms could have a predatory purpose. See ALEXIS JACQUEMlN, THE NEW INDUSfRIAL ORGANIZATION: MARKET FORCES AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
(Fatemeh Mehta trans., 1987); Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolizatioll, and
Antitrust, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSfRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 55, at 537,545-62; see also
Steven F. Benz, Below-Cost Sales and the Buying 0/ Market Share, 42 STAN. L. REV. 695 (1990);
Brenda S. Levine, Predatory Pricing Conspiracies After Matsushita Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp"' Can an Antitrust Plaintiff Survive the Supreme Court's Skepticism?, 22 INT'L LAW. 529
(1988); Martin S. Simkovic, Judicial Tests to Determine Predatory Pricing Before and After Matsushita, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 839 (1990).
59. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (l988) (U[I]nterbrand
competition is the primary concern of the antitrust laws.").
60. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
61. For example, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1984), the
Court wished to preserve the procompetitive and efficiency effects of vertical non-price restraints
upheld in Sylvania. It recognized that the manufacturer, to make the most efficient decisions, must
be in continuous communication with its dealers. The Court wanted to preclude the possibility that
such communication would be treated as per se illegal vertical price agreements and thus it held that
U[t]here must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and ..• distributors were acting independently" for a violation to be found. Id. at 764 (emphasis added).
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Market approach, once procompetitive and efficiency gains are shown,
they are unlikely to be successfully rebutted. 62
Finally, the Modem Market Court has accomplished its incorporation of the new theoretical economic approach through a broad expansion of rule of reason analysis.63 Although the Court has not entirely
abandoned the per se illegal rules established during the Modem Populist
era, it has enveloped them in preliminary rule of reason analysis that
effectively makes per se rules difficult to reach. 64 Even though the development of the Modem Market philosophy on the Court has been influenced primarily by Chicago School scholarship, it does not necessarily
share the goals of the Chicago School-which appears to aim for nearly
unfettered corporate activity.65 Nonetheless, the manner in which the
Modem Market Court currently employs economic analysis has the potential for leading to those results. 66
The potential for overly broad validation does not necessarily mean
that the Court is adopting a Chicago School approach. It is for this reason that the distinction between the Modem Market and Chicago School
philosophies is important. Emphasizing efficiency and procompetitive
criteria in making antitrust decisions, which I characterize as the Modem Market approach, is quite different from the Chicago School philosophy of presuming that business conduct is procompetitive and efficient

62. See, e.g., John J. Flynn, Current Topics in Antitrust: An Antitrust Allegory, 38 HAsTINGS
L.J. 517 (1987); John E. Lopatka, The Case for Legal Enforcement of Price Fixing Agreements, 38
EMORY L.J. 1 (1989); Thomas M. Melsheimer, Economics and Ideology: Antitrust in the 1980s, 42
STAN. L. REv. 1319 (1990); Willard F. Mueller, The Sealy Rcstraints: Restrictions on Free Riding or
Output?, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 1255; William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors'
Injury, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2151 (1990); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Casefor Presuming the Legality
of Quality Motivated Restrictions on Distribution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1988); John P.
Drohan, Comment, Tailoring More Efficient Summary Judgment Standards in Antitrust Conspiracy
Actions: Apex Oil Co. v. Dimauro, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 347 (1988).
63. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses
with Defenses, 77 Goo. L.J. 165 (1988); Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST
L.J. 859 (1989); Tye G. Darland, Antitrust Law-Vertical Price Restraints: Per Se Illegality or Rule
of Reason? Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 14 J. CORP. L. 495 (1989).
64. William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution ofAntitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221 (1989).
65. For example, a court adopting the Modern Market philosophy held that "[a]s a matter of
law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output .•.
[and the restraint] requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market
analysis." NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984). This standard significantly
contrasts with the Chicago School view expressed in Indiana Fed'n of Dentists v. FrC, 745 F.2d
1124 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), discussed infra at notes 230-33, in which that court
stated that without proof of market power the restraint under examination could not be held illegal.
66. See infra notes 83-85, 89 and accompanying text.
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unless certain factors indicate otherwise. 67 The Modem Market philosophy does not necessarily seek the broad scale validation of every business
practice as does the Chicago School;68 rather, it is primarily concerned
with avoiding invalidations of conduct that are in fact fundamentally
procompetitive, even if they do not appear so on the surface. If the
Court's use of economic analysis in the last fifteen years has been for that
purpose (which I believe to be the case),69 then the concern that the
Court has been deliberately moving antitrust law toward the Chicago
School standard is unwarranted.
Such concerns arise because most commentators have not conceptualized a philosophy that adopts efficiency analysis, yet is not the Chicago
School. Such a view is understandable, given the significant role that
Chicago scholars have played in persuading the Court to consider more
subtle efficiency factors. Most scholars who disagree with part or all of
Chicago School arguments either attack Chicago's economic reasoning,
attack the Court's decisions they feel have been unduly influenced by
Chicago thought, or, in recognizing a discrepancy between the tenor of
the Court's opinions and the Chicago framework, attack the assertion
that the Chicago philosophy has prevailed.70
Focusing on the validity of the Chicago approach, and its perceived
impact on the courts, limits debate decrying its problematic aspects. 71
Antitrust literature lacks an affirmative non-Chicago characterization of
the Court's over-arching economic approach. The result is the deflection
of attention away from more positive contributions to the use of economic analyses that move antitrust law in a direction that can be supported by a broader base of scholars.72 My characterization of the
Modem Market School not only offers such a contribution, but it effectively captures the philosophy of economic analysis emerging on the
Court over the last fifteen years. This is not to say, however, that a nonChicago efficiency standard ensures that the criteria the Court uses to
67. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1701 (1986).
68. See supra note 65.
69. Two possible exceptions are the Court's rulings in Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 718 (1988) and Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328
(1990). See infra discussion at note 73.
70. See, e.g., Nolan E. Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to the Cartelizatioll
Standard, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (1985); Fox, supra note 1; Hovenkamp, supra note 1; Frederick
M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and
Economics, 72 GEO. L.I. 1511 (1984); see also Page, supra note 64, at 1254 ("The various references
the Court has made to 'economic efficiency' and 'consumer welfare' as goals are too ambiguous in
their lexical mcaning and in their context to justify the conclusion that the Court has adopted the
Chicago conception of efficiency as its sole standard in antitrust cases.").
71. See. e.g., Kaplow, supra note 20; Page, supra note 64.
72. But see Piraino, supra note 1.
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reach antitrust decisions will not lead to overly broad validations. It is
that very real possibility that other scholars have either overlooked or
treated as an outgrowth of the influence of the Chicago School. The
question of excessive legalization of corporate conduct is one of the important concerns of this Article; it is addressed, however, in the more
appropriate context of the Court's Modem Market philosophy.

4. The Chicago School. In recent years the Modem Market approach has been the predominant philosophy guiding the Court. With
Justice Scalia's appointment to the high tribunal, however, some of the
most recent antitrust decisions of the Court have taken a decidedly different direction. There are indications that the Court may be laying the
groundwork for de facto per se legalization of many business practices.73
The premise underlying the Chicago philosophy is that all markets
fundamentally operate atomistically and that atomistic forces will undermine any efforts by businesses to interfere with them. 74 The Chicago
School is not concerned with aspects of the market structure per se, such
as the number of sellers, but instead focuses its antitrust inquiry on
whether corporate conduct can successfully constrain industrial levels of
output. 7S Proponents of the Chicago School assert that a reduction in
industrial output is essential to any anticompetitive endeavor, and if the
defendants are not able to accomplish that end, then the anticompetitive

73. For example, the Court's decision in Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S.
717 (1988), appears to be laying the groundwork for per se legality of vertical price restraints
through its requirement of an agreement as to specific price levels to find an illegal vertical price
agreement. See, e.g., Jean W. Bums, Rethinking the "Agreement" Element in Vertical Antitrust
Restraints, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1990); Rudolph J. Peritz, The "Rule 0/ Reason" in Antitrust Law:
Property Logic in Restraint o/Competition, 40 HAsTINGS L.J. 285 (1989); Barbara A. White, Black
and White Thinking in the Gray Area 0/Antitrust: The Dismantling 0/ Vertical Restraints Violations,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1991). The Court seemed to continue this trend in Atlantic Richfield
Co. (ARCO) v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990), by requiring the plaintiff to show that the
defendant's illegal vertical price-fixing activities setting price ceilings constituted predatory pricing
before plaintiff could claim antitrust injury. When considered with the Court's position in Matsushita that predatory pricing rarely, if ever, occurred, the ARCO decision appears to make it impossible for a victim of maximum price-fixing successfully to file suit, thereby eliminating another source
of legal sanction against vertical price-fixing. See White, supra. Chicago School proponents have
openly advocated per se legality for vertical price-fixing agreements for some time. See. e.g., Richard
A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment 0/ Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48
U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1981). For the view that Sharp in fact represents the Court's explicit rejection of
the Chicago School view because it did not overturn the per se illegality of vertical price restraints,
see Page, supra note 64, at 1254.
74. See. e.g., BORK, supra note 13, at 116-29.
75. See id. at 179-91.
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impact of any other restraint will necessarily be compromised. 76 Furthermore, they believe that industry-wide restraints on output are difficult to maintain. They argue that efforts to raise prices or monopolize
markets to the detriment of consumers will not succeed if, for example,
firms outside the industry can enter with their own production to compete for the excess profits. Such expansion of output by entering competitors will return prices to their competitive levels. Moreover, the same
result will occur if one or more of the parties to the agreement have a
profit incentive to violate it secretly by expanding output themselves. 77
Implicit in the Chicago School philosophy is that, with the exception of restraints that limit output, corporate endeavors are procompetitive by necessity. Because firms are competing in an atomistic world,
their efforts must be directed toward wooing customers, which requires
providing desirable products and services at the lowest possible prices.78
A court adhering to the Chicago School approach will almost invariably
conclude that the restraints that firms engage in must exist to serve those
ends and therefore must necessarily be efficient.79
Thus, the Chicago School writers strongly support the judicial use
of analyses that demonstrate how market forces would curtail any suspected anticompetitive effects from business restraints. For instance,
they often draw on interbrand-intrabrand analyses and contestable market theories to advocate the validation of scrutinized business practices. so
Chicago School scholars also encourage the recognition of procompetitive and efficiency dimensions of corporate conduct, and argue that the
presence of those aspects should determine an activity's legality.s1 Because these scholars also have a tendency to conclude that output restriction is inherently impossible in nearly every antitrust scenario that they
consider, when that viewpoint is considered with the emphasis on
76. See Wesley J. Liebeler, What Are the Alternatives to Chicago?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 879.
77. Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
135 (1984).
78. Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 1700-01.
79. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Rhetoric and Skepticism in Antitrust Argument, 84 MICH. L.
REv. 1721, 1723-24 (1986).
80. See, e.g., Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand 'Cartels' Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV.
1 (1982).
81. See, e.g., Wesley J. Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review ofAntitrust Developments: Horizontal
Restrictions, Efficiency, and the Per Se Rule, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1019 (1986). Although Chicago
scholars fonnally advocate that antitrust detenninations should be based on weighing and balancing
the efficiency gains against the efficiency losses, the evaluation of those gains and losses must be done
for the most part heuristically. In fact, Chicago scholars, when evaluating any specific conduct,
almost invariably find in favor of upholding the conduct because of the efficiency dimensions they
have discovered. See, e.g., YALE BROZEN, CONCENTRATION, MERGERS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1982); LESTER G. TELSER, A THEORY OF EFFICIENT COOPERATION AND COMPETITION (1987).
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pro competitive and efficient aspects, there is a tendency for Chicago
School followers to uphold every restraint. 82

II.

THE CONUNDRUM OF THE STATUS QUO

A. Economic Reasoning and Overiegitimization

Whether or not it is the Court's intention, the current applications
of economic reasoning in antitrust law may lead inevitably to results that
are consistent with Chicago School values, which, some contend, aim to
dismantle antitrust regulation altogether. 83 The economic analysis engaged in today is more sophisticated than it was in the past; it allows the
Court to ferret out more subtle elements of competitiveness and efficiency.84 Because firms seek to operate efficiently so as to maximize their
profits, and because economic analysis is now so discernitig, such elements can almost always be found in any corporate endeavor. Thus, because the primary criterion used to determine the validity of economic
behavior is the presence of any efficiency or pro competitive effects, and
those effects are almost always possible to discover, if the Court continues in this vein, it will necessarily uphold and legitimize nearly every
business practice examined. 85
The intuitive recognition of such a reality has generated a controversy as to whether economic analysis, or, in particular, efficiency criteria, should give way to other antitrust concerns reflected by the atomistic
model, such as distributive justice, dispersion of concentrations of power,
and economic democracy.86 These goals would emphasize the preservation of a large number of sellers in the market at the expense of other
82. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1984).
83. See, e.g., Fox & Sullivan, supra note 12, at 957 ("Despite the consensus that economics can
playa supporting role, the Chicago School, in the name oflaw and economics, has waged ideological
warfare, assaulting antitrust itself."); Melsheimer, supra note 62, at 1335 ("[I]n the hands of Chicago
School proponents, economics has become an engine for an ideology hostUe to the operation of
antitrust law."); Stephen D. Susman, Business Judgment vs. Antitrust Justice, 76 GEO. L.J. 337, 345
(1987) (asserting that the Supreme Court has been influenced by the Chicago School to the extent
that it is "abandoning any attempt to achieve the political goals of antitrust regulation").
84. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
85. This is certainly the implication of the Court's standard in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), which effectively assures that no violation could be found if efficiency justifications exist. See supra note 61. The Court's willingness to create a category of per se
legality for vertical price restraints, which are otherwise per se illegal, to avoid any possibility of
condemning efficient non-price vertical restraints in Business Elecs. Corp. V. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. 717 (1988), see White, supra note 73, also indicates the extent to which the Court seeks to
preserve every element of efficiency that may arise.
86. See Brodley, supra note 12; Robert H. Landes, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern ofAntitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982);
Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History ofAntitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263.

1066

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vot. 41:1045

competitive effects. Indeed, to ensure that certain activities will be declared illegal, some argue that the modem economic notions of efficiency
and procompetitiveness should be abandoned altogether. 87
Given how the antitrust tools currently available are being used by
the Court in reaching its decisions, the only alteruative to unlimited legalization of problematic business behavior appears to be to forsake modem economic analysis and revert to the Modem Populist approach. That
would result in the Court either looking only to the facial characteristics
of the particular business practice, or engaging in intensive and burdensome data analysis to determine whether the market sufficiently mirrors
the atomistic conception. 88 The former inquiry leads to inflexible rules
that do not consider other competitive and efficiency factors,89 and can
unnecessarily impede economic growth. The latter is not only time- and
labor-intensive, but yields insights that have limited precedential value.
The data results are applicable only to the particular industry in the specific time frame being examined, and therefore economic and legal generalizations caunot be drawn from them.
This apparent restriction of choice either to promote efficiency or to
preserve Populist concerns fuels the controversy as to how antitrust decisions shonld be made. Which side one takes depends on the value choice
of the individual and seems to require sacrifice of other important goals.

B. Conduct over Context
The overlegitimization dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that the
Court's rulings are framed primarily in terms of the validity of the conduct. As a result, it appears as if the Court is approving the particular
business practice independent of the market in which it arose. 90 Taken
87. See, eg., Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust,
62 TuL. L. REv. 1163 (1988); Pitofsky, supra note 13; Lawrence A. Sullivan, Economics and More
Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214
(1977).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
89. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
90. For example, in Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925), the
Supreme Court evaluated the validity of the exchange of cost, price, and sales information among the
members of a trade association. The information was conveyed in a summarized form, such as
average costs and average prices, without specific details as to any particular transaction. The Court
upheld the practice after evaluating its impact in the market context in which it arose. See id. at
566·67. The Court, however, couched its ruling only in terms of the practice of exchanging information. See id. at 568. Subsequent courts have upheld that practice in a wide variety of circumstances;
indeed, one court stated that Maple Flooring stood for a blanket validation of the exchange of general price and cost information among trade associations absent any concerted intent to control the
market. See Wholesale Dry Goods Inst. v. FTC, 139 F.2d 230, 230 (2d Cir. 1943); see also Bolt v.
Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 851 F.2d 1273, 1286 (11th Cir. 1988) (deciding that the exchange of
information among hospitals concerning a particular doctor's habits is acceptable under Maple
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together with the current use of economic analysis, which validates any
conduct with any procompetitive or efficiency effects,91 the danger is that
the Court's focus on conduct will lead to all business practices in all
contexts being upheld. This is not to say that the Court ignores context
when it evaluates a specific business practice. Indeed, the Court often
looks to the marketplace to assist it in determining the competitive and
efficiency effects. The problem is that although there may be special
characteristics of the market that give the practice its procompetitive or
efficiency dimensions, the Court does not abstract those market characteristics when framing its ruling. Instead, it merely finds whether the
practice is competitive or efficient, without linking that conclusion to
those characteristics of the context that make it SO.92 As a result, when
that particular business practice appears in subsequent cases, it is often
viewed as valid even though the market structure may differ markedly
from the original case and may not possess those characteristics that previously rendered the practice competitive or efficient. 93 Although some
Flooring); Penne v. Greater Minneapolis Area Bd. of Realtors, 604 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1979) (permitting the exchange of brokerage fees and other information on listings among members of board
under Maple FlOOring even though it could have a negative effect and belonging to the association
was necessary for survival); supra note 8 and infra note 93 and accompanying text.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
92. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). The district court
concluded, after trial, that the procompetitive effects outweighed the anticompetitive effects of a
contract that tied the services of certain anesthesiologists to the use of the hospital's services. See
Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2, 513 F. Supp. 532, 542-54 (B.D. La. 1981). The court of
appeals reversed on the ground that the tying arrangement was illegal per se. See Hyde v. Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2, 686 F.2d 286, 291-94 (5th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court reversed again,
but on the ground that there was no evidence that price, quality, supply, or demand for either
services had been affected, and therefore the contract did not constitute a tying arrangement. See
Hyde, 466 U.S. at 31-32. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that the Court should
adopt a rule of reason approach with regard to tying arrangements and acknowledge that the ultimate judicial determination of the restraint's legality in reality depended on its economic impact.
See id. at 34-41 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In fact, the Court could go one step further and develop
classifications of market characteristics that render a tying relationship procompetitive.
93. The courts' treatment of exclusive dealerships is a good example of a rule of reason analysis
upholding a practice that subsequently led to validations in virtually every context. In United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the Supreme Court stated that "a manufacturer ofa
product [for which] other and equivalent brands ... are readily available in the market may select
his customers, and for this purpose he may 'franchise' certain dealers to whom, alone, he will sell his
goods." ld. at 376. The Court noted, in addition, that "[i]f the restraint stops at that point-if
nothing more is involved than vertical 'confinement' of the manufacturer's own sales of the merchandise to selected dealers, ... the restriction ... would not violate the Sherman Act." ld. Despite that
apparent qualification, 10 years later the courts treated exclusive dealerships as if they were essentially per se legal. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 997 (9th Cir.
1976) ("There is a veritable avalanche of precedent to the effect that, absent sufficient evidence of
monopolization, a manufacturer may legally grant such an exclusive franchise, even if this effects the
elimination of another distributor.") (citations omitted).
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practices are so inherently procompetitive that competition is almost always enhanced regardless of the market structure,94 this is not true for
all business conduct. 9s
Unfortunately, the problem cannot be resolved simply by the
Court's particularizing its rulings to the specific facts before it. To do so
would render the Court's holding of limited precedential value. The
challenge is to expand the ruling beyond the specifics of the case by acknowledging the predominate aspects of competition and efficiency without, at the same time, creating de facto per se legalization of the practice.
Finding that locus is not merely a matter of draftsmanship; it requires a
shift in orientation from a paradigm of conduct to a paradigm of context-one that enables the Court to exploit the analytic tools available to
evaluate properly the true economic structure of the case.
C.

Out of the Conundrum

The current emphasis on discovering any pro competitive or efficiency aspects, in conjunction with the tradition of issuing rulings in
terms of conduct, limits the effectiveness of modern economic analysis in
Furthennore, the Justice Department's position on exclusive dealerships is that they are generally lawful. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VERTICAL REsTRAINTS GUIDELINES ~ 2.5 (1985), reprinted in 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1243, at 996 (Dec. 5, 1985); see also
SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 21, at 176-77 (1988) ("Although there are interpretations of
Schwinn that leave open the possibility of successfully challenging exclusive dealerships under § 1, in
the aftennath of Sylvania and Monsanto such a possibility seems remote.") (footnote omitted);
Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint o/Trade and the Restatement (Second) o/Contracts,
57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 669, 711 (1982) ("[W]hile it cannot be gainsaid that exclusive representation
agreements may offend restraint of trade principles, there must be a showing of significant anti competitive impact before they will be invalidated.").
94. Some argne that vertical non-price restraints have a great potential to stimulate interbrand
competition and therefore to enhance competition and consumer welfare. See. e.g., Wesley J.
Liebeler, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare: Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp., 36 UCLA L. REv. 889 (1989); Piraino, supra note 62. See generally Betty Bock,
An Economist Appraises Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 117 (1985).
95. Even the Supreme Court has reservations about subsequent applications of its rulings on
business practices in disparate contexts. In Hyde, the Court expressed its concern that traditional
antitrust tying analysis, which was developed in the context of product sales, might, when applied to
the health care arena, lower the quality of medical services. See Hyde. 466 U.s. at 28 n.47.
The Court's tendency to uphold conduct based on the demonstration of any procompetitive or
efficiency aspects has only recently become seriously problematic. Because economic analysis had
not yet reached the level of sophistication it has today, the economic effects that scholars were
arguing to preserve, and to which the Court was responding, were the most salient ones: interbrand
competition, creation of markets, and circumventing transaction costs. Because'overcoming barriers
to those ends was almost invariably procompetitive, broad-based legal rulings were appropriate.
Now, however, that economic analysis is so effective at detecting procompetitive and efficiency effects, it is no longer the case that the presence of those effeets ensures that the market itself is
fundamentally procompetitive in the face of the restraint. Thus, the modem Court's standard to
validate activity whenever procompetitive or efficiency ramifications can be shown can lead to excessive legalization.
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the judicial arena and undermines the Court's ability to use it to make
meaningful distinctions regarding unreasonable restraints of trade. Consequently, the Court fails to take full advantage of the power of modern
economic developments.96 The trade-off between unlimited validation of
business practices, which seems to occur when the courts use economic
analysis, and a more proscribing approach that leads to excessive invalidation and thus impedes economic growth, is not necessary. There is a
way to retain economic analysis in antitrust law to promote efficiency
gains, and yet still allow the courts to make distinctions between competitive and anticompetitive conduct. In other words, the purported Chicago School goals are not the inexorable result of using economic
thinking.
To limit the overly broad effects of rulings based solely on the discovery of any competitive or efficiency aspects of a particular practice,
the Court must do a more holistic market evaluation. Such a comprehensive analysis would consider the way that procompetitive and anticompetitive effects interact in a given environment and whether this
interaction generates a market structure that is fundamentally procompetitive. The Court could then tie the legitimacy of the business practice to
the characteristics of the context that render it competitive, thereby assuring that the business practice, when upheld, would be upheld ouly for
those marketplace scenarios that contain these salient characteristics.
This would require that the Court identify those generic characteristics
of the market that are germane to maintaining the competitive aspects of
the conduct. The Court's ruling would then be tailored to preserving
competitive markets and would have generality for precedential purposes; its scope, however, would not be limitless. Such an approach can
be demonstrated by a countervailing power analysis of restraints of
trade. 97

96. The struggle over whether vertical price-fixing should be per se illegal or legal, for example,
ignores the inroads that economists have made in discerning circumstances when vertical price-fixing
has procompetitive effects and when it has anticompetitive effects. See, e.g., Thomas J. Hoerger &
Andrew W. Horowitz, Retailers as Buffers: Substituting and Optimal Retail Structure (unpublished
manuscript, available from Professor Thomas J. Hoerger, Department of Economics and Business
Administration, Vanderbilt University); Greg Shaffer, Capturing Strategic Rent: Full-Line Forcing,
Brand Discounts, Aggregate Rebates, and Maximum Resale Price Maintenance, 39 J. INDUS. EcON.
557 (1991) (characterizing the profit-maximizing conduct of manufacturers when dcaling with their
retailers).
97. For another demonstration of linking the validation of conduct to the correct market context and of how to frame such rulings, see White, supra note 73 (delineating market circumstances
when vertical price-fixing should and should not be permitted based on recent developments in economic theory).
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III.
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COUNTERVAILING POWER ANALYSIS

A. A Theoretical Approach
In order to see a new way of incorporating economic evaluations of
corporate conduct into antitrust decisions, we must engage in economic
analysis within a different framework. First, we need to acknowledge
formally that economic evaluations of the efficiency and competitiveness
of a specific market need not be undertaken solely through extensive empirical studies. Equally accurate assessments of the competitiveness of
particular markets can be achieved through theoretical analyses. Not
only are theoretical evaluations as discerning as data investigations, but
they can also lead to generalities that transcend the particular industry
being examined, providing guidelines that courts can then use with
greater ease to assess restraints in other industries. 98
There is a serious misconception that economic theory is not capable of being dispositive. Theory is viewed as mere speculation that is not
equipped to make ultimate determinations of economic reality. Statistical data analysis, on the other hand, is treated as more valid because it
consists of the "cold, hard facts." Actually, data results can be quite
speculative because they are sensitive to the empirical methodology employed and the manner in which it is implemented. Not infrequently,
one can achieve widely contradictory results from the same data set with
very small modifications in the data inquiry that a priori may seem innocuous. This is not to say that data studies are useless, but rather that
they cannot be viewed as the ultimate arbiter of the competitiveness of
the marketplace to the exclusion of all other forms of economic
reasoning. 99
98. The Court's decision that promoting interbrand competition is a desirable goal for antitrust
law was based on theoretical economic analysis and was first applied in the context of restraints
imposed by manufacturers on their dealers. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977). The Court has since extended interbrand competition analysis based on economic
theory to a variety of other antitrust contexts. See Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1892 (1990) (antitrust injury); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,
106-07 (1984) (horizontal price restraints); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 694 (1978) (horizontal non-price restrictions).
99. A good example of when theoretical analysis can answer questions that data studies cannot
is the determination of whether regulated firms overcapitalize, that is, allocate too much of their
productive inputs to industrial plants and equipment. The question of overcapitalization of regu·
lated firm was first raised in Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. BeON. REv. 1052 (1962), and became known as the Averch·Johnson
effect. After pUblication of that article, data analyses were attempted to verify empiricaIIy the existence of the phenomenon. See, e.g., WiIIiam J. Boyes, All Empirical Examination of the Averch·
Johnson Effect, 14 BeON. INQUIRY 25 (1976); Leon CourviIIe, Regulation and Efficiency in the Elec·
tric Utility Industry, 5 BELL J. BeON. & MGMT. SCI. 53 (1974); Robert M. Spann, Rate of Return
Regulation and Effieiency in Production: An Empirical Test of the Averch·Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL J.
BeON. & MGMT. SCI. 38 (1974). CourvUIe and Spann engaged in different empirical methodology
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Some suggest that modem economic theory, particularly given its
mathematical basis, is beyond the competence of the courts. loo Although
economic insights are currently developed within a mathematical framework and are thus complex and largely unfamiliar to the legal community, they can be translated into verbal conceptualizations that can be
readily grasped and used by the judiciary. For example, the concept of
contestable markets was first developed in a very abstract mathematical
area of economic theory.IOI Nevertheless, the notion that the extent to
which firms are subject to competitive forces depends on the ease with
which new firms can enter the market is now a commonplace analysis in
antitrust law. lo2
on the same data set, and both found that the Averch-Johnson effect was indeed present. See
Courville, supra, at 72; Spann, supra, at 50-51. Boyes made an independent inquiry with the same
data set, but found that the data did not support Courville's and Spann's conclusions. See Boyes,
supra, at 34.
In 1977, while a graduate student at the California Institute of Technology, Derek McKay
sought to resolve the conflicting results by investigating the research methodology used by all three
authors. Drawing on his experience as an engineer, McKay found that all threc studies' measurement of capital was erroneous. Furthermore, he found that several years of data excluded from
those studies that verified the Averch-Johnson effect were critical to the authors' positive results.
McKay conducted his own study with expanded data and concluded, contrary to Averch and Johnson's prediction, that regulated finus were actually undercapita1ized. See Derek McKay, Two Essays on the Economics of Electricity Supply (1977) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, California Institute of
Technology). McKay's results were ultimately validated by the use of economic theory in W. Davis
Dechert, Has the A verch-Johnson Effect Been Theoretically Justified?, 8 J. EcON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1 (1984) (showing that regulated firms tend to undercapita1ize in relation to unregulated
finus).
100. In United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), in rejecting interbrand competition
arguments supporting horizontal non-price restraints, Justice Thurgood Marshall noted:
The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems. Our
inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the
economy against promotion of competition in another sector is one important reason we
have fonuulated per se rules [of illegality].
Id. at 609-10 (footnote omitted).

101. See BAUMOL, supra note 56.
102. Contestable market theory underlies the argument that predatory pricing is not a viable
corporate strategy. A successful predatory pricing strategy requires first that the firm drive its competitors out by charging prices below competitive levels, and second, that the predatory firm charge
prices above competitive levels to recoup its losses. The firm will not succeed if the market is contestable, that is, iffirms can re-enter the market relatively easily. If the market is contestable, then as
soon as the firm raises its prices above competitive levels (thereby earning the excess profits necessary to compensate its losses), other firms will enter the market and drive prices back down to
competitive levels. Under these circumstances, the predatory firm will never recover the losses it
incurred during its predation; furthenuore, because it will be forced to charge the same competitive
price as before, it will never earn more profits than if it had never engaged in the strategy from the
beginning. It was this argument that persuaded the Court in Matsushita to grant summary judgment for the defendant. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582-

85, 598 (1986).
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Adopting a more theoretical economic approach would broaden the
scope of rule of reason analysis in judicial antitrust decisions. The Modem Populist School argues that the Court should circumscribe extensive
rule of reason inquiry, particularly in those cases that involve economic
data, because the resulting decisions do not provide the certainty for the
business community that per se rules do. 103 Although it is of a rule of
reason nature, theoretical economic analysis can also provide certainty
for the business community, but without creating inflexible rules of illegality or engaging in cumbersome data investigations. Courts that apply
theoretical analyses could develop characteristics that indicate the presence of competition in the market structure under examination. If those
earmarks were then discovered in other market contexts, they would be
strong indicators of the conclusions that the courts would reach.
In reality, courts have been using theoretical reasoning for some
time, providing the kind of assurance for the business community that is
sought by the Modem Populist School. For example, the distinction between interbrand and intrabrand competition was achieved using an application of theoretical analysis to determine the competitiveness of
vertical non-price restraints. 104 As a result, and almost without exception, when manufacturers engage in non-price vertical restraints in an
interbrand context, they will not be found in violation of antitrust
laws. lOS The creation of such well-defined characteristics for determining
market competitiveness assures certainty without the danger of
overlegitimization.
Theoretical analysis thus promotes accuracy, efficiency, and certainty both for the courts and for the business community. Given the
value of theoretical analysis, we must now determine how to apply it so
that it can properly assist the courts in making discriminating choices.
B.

Countervailing Power Theory

The countervailing power approach that I offer not only reveals the
advantages of emphasizing theoretical reasoning, it also offers a new tool
that delineates characteristics of competition in certain market scenarios.

103. See William s. Comanor & John B. Kirkwood, Resa/e Price Maintenance and Antitrust
Po/icy, CoNTEMP. POL'y ISSUES, Spring 1985, at 9, 14.
104. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52-57 (1977).
105. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Rice v. Norman
Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982); Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1989).
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Once these characteristics are found, the courts will know that the market scenario is competitive, thereby obviating the need for excessive concern with whether the conduct, examined by itself, is too fraught with
anticompetitive aspects.
Countervailing power analysis focuses on an economic phenomenon
in which parties combine in some fashion that raises antitrust suspicion. 106 This combination is in response to a concentration of market
power that adversely affects the parties combining, but which is nevertheless 1egal. 107 The question raised is whether the countervailing combination should be considered an illegal restraint of trade. As we have seen,
the Court typically evaluates the restraint on its own terms,108 looking
only to whether there are competitive dimensions to it, assessing it by the
extent to which the defendant's conduct emulates the atomistic mode1. 109
If a court adopting the Modern Populist philosophy is making the determination, the restraint is likely to be invalidated; a court adopting the
Modern Market philosophy, however, wonld tend to uphold the restraint. Regardless of its philosophical approach, the Court does not
frame its rnling in terms of how the market interacts with the restraint.
In particular, when the restraint arises as a countervailing force to the
legal concentration, the Court's ruling does not reflect whether the legal
concentration or other market forces can keep in check any anticompetitive dimensions held by the countervailing combination.
Countervailing power analysis offers one way to assess the restraint's interaction with the marketplace so as to determine whether
there are dynamics that will keep the restraint competitive. If those dynamics are discovered, then countervailing power analysis suggests that
the practice should be upheld, independent of whether the practice mirrors atomistic behavior. If those dynamics are not found, and the practice is sufficiently anticompetitive by traditional standards, then
countervailing power analysis supports its condemnation.
1. Judicial Scrutiny of Countervailing Restraints: The Cases. The
four Supreme Court cases that focus directly on countervailing power
activity, Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 110 Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States,1l1 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,112 and
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See infra notes 115-41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17-82 and accompanying text.
246 U.S. 231 (1918).
288 U.S. 344 (1933).
405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 113 point to several key characteristics of the countervailing phenomenon. These features include an
arguably illegal restraint of trade that serves to protect powerless individuals from an exploiting legal concentration, thereby putting them on an
equal footing. My countervailing power approach, however, suggests
that in order for the restraint to be declared legal, these characteristics
must be accompanied by market dynamics that preserve competition in
spite of the restraint's anticompetitive aspects. Moreover, as we will see,
when a countervailing restraint functions competitively, overall competition is inevitably enhanced by its presence. 114 Thus, my countervailing
power theory argues that whenever a countervailing restraint functions
competitively it should be upheld.

a.

Countervailing power

i. Arguably illegal restraints. Each of the four cases examined involves a combination or rule, or an aspect thereof, that has all
the elements of an illegal restraint of trade.ll5 But whether the Court
declares such conduct illegal usually depends on the particular Court's
antitrust philosophy. For example, Chicago Board of Trade, a 1918 decision reflecting the Intuitive Atomistic School, concerned a rule imposed
by the Commodities Board, which fixed prices for a certain type of grain
for a limited time period.1 16 The question was whether this rule constituted horizontal illegal price fixing. 117 Even though all the elements of
horizontal price fixing were present,118 the Court, consistent with the Intuitive Atomistic philosophy, upheld the practice by balancing the extent
113. 457 U.S. 332 (l982).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 238-43.
115. Three of the cases concerned some aspect of price fixing: Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 237 (1918) (board setting prices of certain commodities); Appalachian Coals v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1933) (regional coal miners fonning a corporation to set a
common price); and Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1982) (doctors voting colleetively on fce schedule to use for insurance purposes). One case, United States v.
Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 612 (1972), involved horizontal territorial and customer restraints
limiting intrabrand competition.
116. Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 237. The Board fixed thc price of "to arrive" grain
that arrived during the time period when the exchange was closed. It set the price equal to the day's
closing market pricc; that price remained in force overnight until the start of business the following
morning. When the new business day began, the price of "to arrive" was once again detennined by
the market. Id.
117. Id. at 238-39.
118. The Board set the price for "to arrive" grain for all the grain sellers delivering to the
Chicago area after business hours, thereby preventing the prices from falling below that set by the
market at close. Id. at 237.
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of the restraint against its procompetitive impacts on the market. 119
Such a price rule, however, would clearly have been declared per se illegal by a Court following the Modem Populist philosophy.120 Indeed, in
a case strongly paralleling the pricing restraint in Chicago Board of
Trade, the Court in the Modem Populist era did call the activity horizontal price fixing and therefore per se illegal. 121
Similarly, in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 122 a 1972 Modem Populist decision, the Court held that horizontal territorial and customer restrictions imposed by an association of regional supermarkets on
the marketing of jointly manufactured private label goods were per se
illegal.123 The Court condemned the practice, in spite of the strong presence of interbrand competition circumventing the anticompetitive effects
the restraints had on intrabrand competition. 124 In contrast, in the 1977
119. See id. at 241. The Supreme Court noted the rule's short duration and its applicability to
only a limited portion of grain sold. Because the rule assured that grain sellers would not be subjected to price gouging if their grain arrived late at night, the Court reasoned that this certainty
would encourage more grain dealers to use the Chicago market and thereby open it up to more
competitive activity. For further discussion, sec infra notes 156, 167-74 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. The Modem Populists' tendency to focus on
the restraint itself to see if it sets prices would almost certainly lead a Modem Populist court to
declare the Board's activity per se illegal. The Modem Populists have made it clear that once price
fixing is involved, no procompetitive or efficiency arguments will sway them away from finding the
activity per se illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972) (reversing
the district court's judgment and holding iustead that the horizontal restraints in question were per
se illegal, stating: "Whether or not we would decide this case the same way under the rule of reason
used by the District Court is irrelevant to the issue before us.").
121. See Cata1ano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (discussed supra note 44). The
restraint involved in Catalano-a wholesalers' agreement not to extend short-term credit-did not
directly involve price-fixing as did the restraint in Chicago Board of Trade. See id. at 644-47. The
Catalano restraint did, however, affect one of the components that contributed to the market price's
determination. See id. at 648. Even though the Catalano restraint was further removed from pricefixing than the Chicago Board of Trade's, the Modem Populist Court nevertheless refused to consider the lower court's market impact analysis under a rule of reason because the restraint i1ldirectly
affected prices. Therefore, the Court said, the restraint was per se illegal. See id. at 650; supra note
44.
122. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).

123. See id. at 608. The regional supennarket chains faced stiff competition from the national
supennarket chains because the national chains were marketing high quality goods under their own
private labels at a price below national brands. The national supermarkets were able to charge such
low prices and yet maintain quality because they were able to take advantage of the cconomies of
scale arising from the volume of goods they purchased. None of the individual regional chains, by
themselves, were able to achieve such economies. Their only opportunity to do so was to form
collectively a larger organization for the sole purpose of manufacturing their own private label, the
Topco Brand. The customer and territorial restrictions were imposed so that the member chains
would not compete with each other with respect to Topco products. ld. at 598-604.
124. See id. at 610-11. Even though the restrictions prevented the members of Topco from
competing with each other, they still had to compete with the national chains, which was why Topco
was initially formed.
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Continental T.. v., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 125 case, the Modern Market
Court overturned a 1967 ruling that vertical non-price restraints were per
se illegal. 126 The Sylvania Court found that the interbrand competition
promoted by vertical non-price restraints was procompetitive and could
curtail any anticompetitive effects the restraint had on intrabrand competition. Such restraints, the Court held, should be judged under the rule
of reason and upheld when the overall effect was sufficiently procompetitive. 127 Because the same economic dynamics were also present in the
Topco case, one could infer that a Modern Market court would find that,
because those horizontal non-price restraints faced strong interbrand
procompetitive forces, they should also escape per se condemnation. 128
That the legality of the restraints depends on the philosophy of the
Court is particularly apparent in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society,129 a 1982 four-three decision. The case involved doctors collectively voting to set maximum prices for their services. 130 Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court was fundamentally grounded on Modern
Populist principles and declared the activity per se illegal horizontal price
fixing and therefore illegal. 131 The dissent, on the other hand, took a
125. 433 U.s. 36 (1977).

126. See id. at 58 (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967».
127. See id. at 49-54.
128. A market criticism of the Topeo ruling can be found in BORK, supra note 13, at 275-79.
There is a growing trend toward acknowledging the procompetitive effects of some horizontal restraints. See cases cited supra notes 49-50. See generally Martin B. Louis, Restraints Ancillary to
Joint Ventures and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and
Broadcast Music?, 66 VA. L. REv. 879 (1980). Although the Court recently upheld its Topeo ruling
that horizontal market divisions were per se illegal, see Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 40 I
(1990), that case involved two competitors who entered an agreement that was not supportive of
interbrand competition. In Palmer, one of the competitors agrced to leave the territory to give the
other monopoly power. In exchange, the first competitor received a fee and a percentage of the
profits. Id. Immediately upon signing the agreement, the second competitor increased the pricc of
its service by over 250%. Id. at 402. Clearly this agreement should be found illegal, whcther under
a per se analysis or a rule of reason standard. Because the Court appears to be reluctant to overturn
formally its decision of per se illegality for horizontal territorial restraints, it could casily follow the
path it has used in a number of other cases in which it held the procompetitive effects of the activity
were too strong to condemn. This route involves a preliminary rule of reason analysis to determine
whether the activity's procompetitive aspects caused it to fall outside of the proscribed per se illegal
category. This certainly is the tack the Modern Market Court took in NCAA v. Board of Regents,
468 U.S. 85 (1984), and Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), and one that
a Modern Market Court could have taken if it had ruled on Topeo.
129. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
130. Id. at 335-36. One of the primary activities of thc medieal society was to establish a schedule of maximum fees that participating doctors would agree to accept as full payment of their services from insurance companies. Id. at 339.
131. See id. at 351 ("The respondents' principal argument is that theperse rule is inapplicable
because their agreements are alleged to have procompetitivejustifications [oflowering patients' medical bills]. ... The anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their
facial invalidation even ifprocompetitivejustifications are offered for some."); ef. NCAA, 468 U.S. at
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pure Modem Market approach and pointed to various factors that would
militate against the anticompetitive potential of the horizontal price restraint by the doctors. 132
The results in Chicago Board of Trade, Topco, and Maricopa were
consistent with the particular Court's philosophy. That, however, is not
always true. The 1933 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States 133 opinion focused on a combination of small coal miners to set prices of threefourths of the coal production in the region.I 34 Notwithstanding the
Modem Populist tendencies of the Court,135 and the restraint's strong
resemblance to horizontal price fixing by that standard,136 the Court upheld the contract. 137 The decision is often viewed as an aberration, 138
and perhaps the Justices were swayed by the poverty of the coal miners
during the Depression. 139 As we shall see, however, this interpretation is
correct, but for the wrong reasons. The Court was intuitively responding
to the powerlessness of the group,l40 a key feature that gives rise to countervailing power analysis.
Thus, the restraints in these cases have the necessary ingredients to
be declared illegal, as seen by the fact that in each case, one court (either
the Supreme Court or a lower federal court) found the restraint illegal,
whereas the other found sufficient pro competitive effects to uphold it.141
101 (holding that the horizontal price·fixing agreement before them should not be condemned under
a per se illegal standard).
132. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 360-61 (powell, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed to the com·
petition between doctors for patients who were not covered by the relevant insurance programs, the
doctors' freedom to join or withdraw from the organization as they wish, the patients' freedom to
choose any doctor whether or not the doctor was a participant, and the insurance companies' incentives to keep fees low. Id.
133. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
134. See id. at 356-57, 371 (stating that 137 of the 267 miners in the area were members of the
Appalachian Coals selling group and were defendants in the action).
135. See infra text accompanying notes 175-82.
136. See Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 373. The coal miners elected to use one agent who
would negotiate the selling price of coal for all of them collectively, thereby removing any incentive
for the coal miners to compete with each other.
137. See id. at 378.
138. See, e.g., PHILUP AltEEDA, ANrrrRusr ANALYSIS 454 (3d ed. 1981); Fox & SULLIVAN,
supra note 31, at 294-95.
139. See Fox & SULUVAN, supra note 31, at 294-95. Because of the Depression and organized
buyer cooperatives, the coal miners were forced to sell coal at distressed prices.
140. See infra notes 142, 157.
141. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 336 (overruling the Ninth Circuit, which upheld the collective
voting on price schedules); Topco, 405 U.S. at 597 (overruling the U.S. District Court for the Northern District ofIllinois, which had upheld the territorial and customer restraints); Appalachian Coals,
288 U.S. at 347-48 (overruling the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, which
had held the price restraint illegal); Chicago Board o/Trade, 246 U.S. at 237-38 (overruling the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which had declared price restraint illegal).
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Whether they are actually invalidated depends on the Court's receptiveness to other procompetitive dimensions.

ii. Legal concentrations of power. Countervailing restraints occur because of a market force that undermines the competitive
capabilities of the parties who engage in the restraint. The market force
typically takes the form of a concentration of power that enables it to
take advantage of the parties when they are not in combination. Furthermore, the market force is legal; indeed, its concentration of power is beneficial to society. Thus, in Appalachian Coals, the agency representing
the coal miners was formed in response to large buyer cooperatives from
the east coast who used their leverage to negotiate extremely low prices
with the individual coal miners.142 Although the buyer cooperatives
were able to take advantage of the coal miners, they were nevertheless
legal 143 and served society's interest. The buyers, acting as middlemen
between the producers of coal and the ultimate consumers, reduced the
transaction costs of such large scale purchases,l44 thereby promoting
efficiency.
Similarly, in Topco, small regional supermarkets formed an association to produce private label brands at lower cost.14S Topco Associates
was formed in response to the competitive impact of the national chains
marketing their own private label goodS. 146 The national chains were
able to maintain high quality and low prices because of the economies of
scale stemming from their extensive buying power; 147 this concentration
of purchasing power was legal and enhanced consumer welfare. 148
Legal concentrations of power come in various forms and need not
stem from a combination or large economic entity. For example, in Chicago Board of Trade, the price-fixing rule was implemented to limit the
negotiating power of the few buyers available to purchase the grain that
arrived when the exchange was closed. 149 In general, commodity buyers
regularly maintained storage facilities for the grain, enabling the individual grain sellers to avoid expensive drayage fees that they would otherwise have incurred if they could not sell to these buyers. ISO When the
142. Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 364 ("The highly organized and concentrated buying power
which they control and the great abundance of coal available have contributed to make the market
for coal a buyers' market for many years past.").
143. Id. at 373.
144. Id. at 369 & n.7.
145. 405 U.S. at 599-600.
146. Id. at 599 n.3; see supra note 123-24.
147. 405 U.S. at 599 n.3.
148. Id.
149. 246 U.S. at 240; see supra notes 116, 118.
150. 246 U.S. at 240.
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exchange was closed, however, and only a few buyers 'were available,
these buyers gained a negotiating advantage, permitting them to
purchase the grain at below-market prices. 1S1 Nevertheless, the buyers'
maintenance of readily available storage facilities at all times wonld be
less costly to society than if each seller had to provide his own grain
shelter. Storage services provided by on-site buyers wonld lead to the
construction of fewer facilities that were used more frequently than if offsite sellers had made their own provisions. As a result, a smaller amount
of society'S resources were absorbed for those services-a more desirable
outcome. Moreover, when the exchange was open and all the buyers
were competing, the effective selling price of those storage services would
be correspondingly reduced and would nltimately lead to lower prices for
the consumer. Thus, although the commodity buyers could exert monopoly power at night, the services they provided were in society's
interest.
The legal concentration of power may also reside in diffuse individuals who have exclusive access to knowledge and expertise of critical value
that is being sold in the marketplace. In Maricopa, the individual doctors were charging monopoly prices for their services. 1s2 The individual
patients were in no position to negotiate those fees, and therefore could
not take advantage of the atomistic aspects of the doctor's market. 1S3
The insurance companies, however, by representing large numbers of patients, could negotiate fee schedules to which the doctors would collectively agree. 1S4 It is certainly legal and beneficial for doctors to possess
such life-preserving medical knowledge, even though such knowledge
gives the doctors the capacity to charge high fees. 1ss
Ill.
Redressing negotiating inequality. In each case, the
restraint in question served to put the disadvantaged parties on equal
footing with the legal concentration of power. This came about by a rule

151. Id.
152. 457 u.s. at 350 n.20.
153. Id. at 366 n.13 (powell, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 353-54 nn.28-29.
155. Even though prior to the arrangement in Maricopa the doctors were not engaging in any
horizontal agreements, they were still able to charge above-competitive prices, albeit independently
of each other. This results from the imperfect information in the market. Because patients do not
have an effective mcans of determining the quality of the medieal service received, they cannot distinguish one doctor from another on the basis of her competency. Because medical services are
essential for maintaining a healthy life, price competition among doctors serves no advantage since
the patient has no idea if she is giving up anything to see a lower priced physician. In such circumstances, economists have demonstrated that the equilibrium price among physicians will be the monopoly price and not the competitive price, and wiII occur without any collusion whatsoever. See
Mark A. Satterthwaite, Consumer Information, Equilibrium Industry Price, and the Number ofSellers, 10 BELL J. EcON. 483, 483, 485 (1979).
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or entity that protected an otherwise diffuse group that was vulnerable
because the members of that group were limited to operating atomistically. Thus, in Chicago Board of Trade, the rule to fix prices for midnight deliveries of grain ensured that the small grain sellers (who were at
the mercy of the few grain buyers) could sell their goods at market
levels. ls6 In Appalachian Coals, the agency served a similar function by
creating a stronger bargaining position for the coal miners when faced
with the large buying combines. lS7
In Appalachian Coals and Chicago Board of Trade, the countervailing rule was itself in question. ISS In Topco and Maricopa, the countervailing combinations themselves were not in question, but one of the
aspects of implementing the countervailing power was alleged to be illegal. In Topco, the association of small regional supermarket chains was
formed to protect the individual supermarkets from the marketing strategy of the national chains by enabling the association members to take
advantage of economies of scale. ls9 The Court questioned the territorial
and customer restrictions that were critical to the effectiveness of the association's purposes. l60 Without these restrictions, the members would
have had to engage in intrabrand competition and would have ultimately
undermined the interbrand competition that the association was designed
to promote. 161
Finally, in Maricopa, a complex case in which the economic dynamics are more difficult to discern, a medical foundation was formed to negotiate fee schedules between the insurance companies and the doctors of
the community.162 The question was whether the doctors' voting collectively on the fee schedule constituted horizontal price fixing. 163
Although the Supreme Court found it to be a violation,l64 the collective
voting was essential for the fee schedules to be effective so that doctors
who did not go along with the price maximums would be effectively foreclosed from part of their market. 16S The fee schedules protected the patients who were individually unable to negotiate medical charges that
156. See 246 U.S. at 240; supra notes 116, 118.
157. See 288 U.S. at 372; supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
158. See Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 356-57; Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 237.
159. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 599 (1972); supra note 124.
160. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 603-04; supra note 124.
161. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 623 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
162. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,353-54 n.28 (1982).
163. See id. at 352-53.
164. See id. at 356-57.
165. If insurance companies approached doctors individually, as Justice Stevens suggested, see
id. at 352 n.26, it is unlikely that any doctor, on her own, would agree to a price.maximum. Each
doctor would consider whether she would lose any patients by not agreeing to the maximum. The
first doctor approached would know that there would be no cheaper alternatives for the patient to
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would not exceed the maximum the insurance companies were willing to
pay.166 Thus, the collective voting in effect protected the diffuse group of
patients who were powerless to exploit the competitive possibilities inherent in the doctors' atomistic environment.

b. Ensuring competition. Even though the countervailing
conduct serves to protect a diffuse and powerless group, given the potential anticompetitiveness of the countervailing restraint, the Court must
still determine whether the market environment will nevertheless remain
fundamentally competitive. This can only be done by an assessment of
the market context that ascertains whether essential characteristics of
competitive forces in the particular market scenario are in place. If the
combination of competitive forces is sufficient to ensure that the intrinsic
character of the market is competitive notwithstanding the restraint,
then the restraint shonld be upheld for that market context. Although
such an evaluation must be conducted on a case-by-case basis, once it has
been made, the Court will have a combination of competitive characteristics and restraints that it knows will ensure competition. These characteristics will be of a generalized nature and therefore can be used in
subsequent cases to determine competitiveness; in tum, subsequent cases
may themselves yield other salient competitive aspects. An examination
of the four countervailing power cases shows us how to look for and
weigh the adequacy of those characteristics to ensure a fundamentally
competitive market.

i. Are the market's own competitive forces undermined?
In Chicago Board of Trade, there was a legal concentration that stimulated a countervailing price restraint,167 indicating that countervailing
power analysis should be applied. The Court, however, gave short shrift
select, and therefore the doctor would be in no danger of losing clients. The only impact of agreeing
to the maximum would be to reduce the doctor's income. Because this would be the decision process
that each doctor would make, the insurance companies would likely be unsuccessful at entering
price-ceiling agrecments with doctors on an individual basis.
On the other hand, if all the doctors voted collectively on the price-ceilings, each individual
doctor would have to consider the ramifications of not adhering to the agreement. If collective
voting was allowed, each doctor's patient would have available to her a wide range of doctors who
offered full insurance coverage. In that case, the doctor who did not adhere to the price-maximum
would be in danger of losing patients. The discrepancy in the success of individual agreements and
collective agreements would be greater in larger cities than in smaller towns. The smaller the locale,
the more accessible the information about the quality of doctors and the prices they charge. Hence,
the smaller the locale, the more successful individual contracting would likely be between doctor and
insurance companies.
166. See id. at 341.
167. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 235 (1918); supra text accompanying notes 149-51.
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to thc significant role the legal concentration played. 168 Notwithstanding
the lack of explicit concern with the legal concentration's anticompetitive
aspects, the Court seemed to respond intuitively to that issue. Writing
on behalf of the Court, Justice Brandeis engaged in an atomistic analysis
that acknowledged the price restraint's countervailing effect. He accurately gauged that the market remained competitive despite, and perhaps
because of, the horizontal price restriction. 169 He did so by looking at
the portion of the market affected by the price rule and noting the strict
limitations on its impact. 170
These limitations on the scope and duration of the price restraint
allowed the remaining market to exert its competitive dynamics in a way
that would adequately curtail any anticompetitive effects that the rule
might have. 171 In particular, because the percentage of grain afiected
was small, the grain market itself could overpower any tendency that the
price rule might have to raise prices above market levels. 172 In addition,
the rule anchored the overnight price to the marketplace, setting it equal
to the market price from the prior day, and returning the price's determination to the atomistic market forces upon the rule's expiration the following morning. 173 Finally, Justice Brandeis noted that the protection
provided by the price rule would encourage more sellers to come to the
Chicago market, thereby preserving that market's competitive nature. 174
Chicago Board of Trade thus teaches us that one way to evaluate the
competitiveness of the market in the face of countervailing restraints is to
look at the extent to which the market is affected and determine whether
the unaffected market can mitigate the anticompetitive impact of the restraint through the market's own procompetitive dynamics.
iL The legal concentration as a competitive check: external pressures. In Appalachian Coals, the Court, consistent with the
Modern Populist philosophy, did not emphasize the competitive dynamics of the market to make its determination. Instead it looked primarily
to the restraint itself, the parties' intent, and the detailed data analysis

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See Chicago Board o/Trade, 246 U.S. at 239-41.
See id. at 240.
See id. at 239-41; supra note 119.
See Chicago Board o/Trade, 246 U.S. at 239-41.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 239.
See id. at 240-41.
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presented in evidence.17S In spite of that approach, in a nearly unanimous decision,176 the Justices upheld the legality of an agency that set
prices on behalf of seventy-three percent of all the production in the region. When viewed through the Modem Populist prism, this practice is
unambiguous price fixing.
Even though the Court acknowledged that the motives fostering a
restraint were not determinative ofthat conduct's legality,177 it nevertheless gave as the primary reason for upholding the practice the coal miners' intent to combat industrial difficultiesP8 Typical of the Modem
Populist perspective, Chief Justice Hughes characterized the problems
facing the coal miners-pyramiding, misrepresentations, and credit
losses-as evils pervading the industryP9 Surprisingly, included among
the evils were the organized buyer cooperatives that constituted the legal
concentration180 and that, as we have seen, promoted efficiency by reducing the transaction costs of sales. 181 Expressing concern for the distress
in the coal producing industry, the Justices validated the price-fixing conduct because they saw it as combatting those industrial illS. 182 Finally,
the Court bolstered its conclusion by noting that the data analysis

175. See infra text accompanying notes 177-83.
176. Justice McReynolds was the lone dissenter. See Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 378 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). He remarked only that he thought the lower court reached the correct
conclusion in granting the injunction. ld.
177. See id. at 372 ("Good intentions will not save a plan otherwise objectionable, but knowledge of actual intent is an aid in the interpretation of facts and prediction of consequences.'') (citation omitted).
178. See id.:
With respect to defendant's purposes, we find no warrant for determining that they were
other than those they declared...• The evidence leaves no doubt of the existence of the
evils at which defendants' plan was aimed. The industry was in distress.... If evil conditions could not be entirely cured, they at least might be alleviated.... So far as actual
purposes are concerned, the conclusion of the court below was amply supported that defendants were engaged in a fair and open endeavor to aid the iudustry in a measurable
recovery from its plight.
See also id. at 376-77 ("[T]he mere number and extent of the production of those engaged in a
cooperative endeavor to remedy evils which may exist in an industry, and to improve competitive
conditions, should not be regarded as producing illegality.").
179. See id. at 361-63. Many Modem Populist courts had a tendency to frame evaluations in
terms of evil or good, nefarious or honest. Although more often they tended to apply the negative
characterization to the conduct under examination, in some circumstances, such as here, they would
view the market structure in that light. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 345-46 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (characterizing United
Shoe's conduct).
180. Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 363-64.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
182. See Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 376-77.
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presented did not give sufficient indication that prices would be unduly
affected. 183
The economic facts of Appalachian Coals provide significant insight
into the more subtle facets of competition that can exist in a market, and
that can curtail the anticompetitive effects of a countervailing restraint.
Appalachian Coals involved a face-off between the coal producer sellers
and the buyers, who themselves were intermediaries between the sellers
and the final consumer.184 Within the microcosm of the countervailing
power market, the struggle was over the profits to be made when the coal
was ultimately sold in the consumer market. Each party's respective
share of the profits was to be determined by the price at which the producer sold the coal to the intermediate buyer. Although the agency representing the coal miners would have raised selling prices between the
miners and the buying cooperatives, the essential competitive question
was not whether those prices would have risen, but whether those higher
prices would have caused the prices in the consumer market also to rise.
In the Appalachian Coals scenario, the answer was no.
Even though the agency represented three-fourths of the coal production in the region,185 it represented only twelve percent of the coal for
sale in the relevant consumer market. 186 This meant that the final market price was set atomistically in the consumer market in which there
were a large number of buyers and sellers. Because the purpose of the
buyer cooperatives was to sell the coal in the consumer market,187 the
consumer market necessarily provided a price ceiling. Clearly, the buyer
cooperatives would have been unwilling to pay a higher price to purchase
coal than it could get in the consumer market. Therefore, even though
forming an agency enabled the miners to receive a higher price for their
coal, the ensuing price restraint did not affect the consumer.
Thus, Appalachian Coals tells us that if the power being countervailed against can act as a check on the anticompetitive effects of the
countervailing restraint, the market-for society'S purpose-remains
competitive. Appalachian Coals shows that one way to determine if the
legal concentration can act as a check is to ascertain whether it is itself
183. See id. at 368 ("[A]n examination of [the elaborate statistics introduced] fails to disclose an
adequate basis for the conclusion that the operation of the defendant's plan would produce an injurious effect upon competitive conditions •... n); id. at 373 ("The evidence ••. makes it impossible to
conclude that defendants through the operation of their plan will be able to fix the price of coal in
the consuming markets.").
184. See id. at 356-58.
185. Id. at 357.
186. Id. The relevant market was all coal production east of the Mississippi River.
187. Id. at 373.
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subject to competitive forces, outside the countervailing scenario, sufficient to induce it to limit the anticompetitive aspects of the countervailing restraint.
lll.
The legal concentration as a competitive check: internal pressures. In Topco, the Court's concern was not with the combination to produce the private label goods, but with the territorial and
customer restrictions on selling those goods. 188 Because the non-price
restrictions precluded intrabrand competition, that is, because the members of the association could not compete with each other with respect to
the Topco private label brands,189 the question was whether the market
exerted competitive forces sufficient to limit any undue price rises in
Topco goods as a result of those restrictions. In the Topco scenario the
answer was yes. As in Appalachian Coals, the legal concentration that
Topco was formed to countervail against (here, the national supermarket
chains) would limit any such price rises resulting from the territorial and
customer restrictions. 190 In Topco, however, the legal concentration acted as a check because it was also a seller in direct competition with the
combining seller parties. Therefore, the competitive force exerted on the
legal concentration arose from within the market context. This is in contrast to Appalachian Coals, in which the legal concentration was a buyer
that acted as a check because of the competitive forces exerted on it from
without. 191 Thus, whether the legal concentration can obviate the anticompetitive aspects of the countervailing restraint does not depend on
whether the competitive forces exerted on it are from within or without
the market in which the restraint operates.

iv. Self-policing countervailing power. In Maricopa, the
Court acknowledged the consumer benefit derived from insurance companies negotiating maximum fees with doctors,192 but expressed concern
for the potential of maximum fee setting turning into minimum fee setting. 193 The Court noted that no arguments or evidence were given to
justify the doctors' voting collectively on these fees. 194 Asserting that the

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 603-04 (1972).
ld. at 602.
ld. at 622-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 185-87.
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 352 (1982).
See id. at 347.
See id. at 352-53 & n.26.
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insurance companies could negotiate prices with the doctors individually,195 Justice Stevens declared the collective voting scheme horizontal
price fixing and therefore per se illegal. 196
The doctors' collective voting, however, was essential for the countervailing power to be effective in keeping prices down for the patients.
The doctors would have had no incentive to agree to maximum fees with
the insurance companies unless they knew that all the other doctors
would participate. 197 Absent collective participation, no doctor would be
in danger of losing patients to other doctors who charged lower fees. The
question therefore should have been not whether the collective voting
had anticompetitive potential, but whether the market structure contained sufficient forces to prevent the doctors, voting collectively, from
raising their prices to the monopoly level. The answer in Maricopa was
yes because the insurance companies, who were an integral part of the
countervailing power, had an incentive to keep fees IOW. 198 Although
this incentive worked to the patients' advantage, it did not stem from the
insurance companies' concern for the patients. It arose because of the
insurance compauies' concern for marketing their own product that had
to compete in an atomistic world, and that in turn required keeping premiums IOW. 199 That could only come about if the insurance companies'
costs for reimbursing medical bills were also kept low. Thus, the insurance companies were in effect standing in the shoes of the diffuse group
of consumers, negotiating lower prices with the doctors.2oo
In Maricopa, the countervailing power consisted of several components: the medical foundation that arbitrated the fees, the insurance
companies that agreed to cover the fees, and the doctors who agreed to
accept the limitations on the fees. One party to the countervailing power
195. See id. a.t 353-54 & n.28.
196. See id. at 355-57.
197. See supra note 165.
198. The Maricopa dissent is the only opinion that reflected some recognition of the countervailing power phenomenon. Justice Powell, in supporting the plan, pointed to the insurance companies' motive to contain costs. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 361 (powell, J., dissenting).
199. Of course, there is the theoretical possibility that the insurance companies and the doctors
would conspire together to charge the monopoly price with the two groups dividing the excess profits between them. This could only come about, however, if all the insurance companies in the nation
were involved in the conspiracy. Such cartel activity could not survive as long as there were other
insurance companies ready to compete for those excess profits. For all practical purposes, the insurance industry is in fact highly competitive. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 354 n.29 ("In this case it appears
... that there is competition among insurance companies ••.•"); Ben Z. Hershberg, Blue Cross Sees
Test Ahead, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 24, 1991, at El (Competition among insurance companies is "heating up to a fever pitch it hasn't reached for the last two years.").
200. As the dissent noted, insurers may be the ouly parties who have the effeetive power to
restrain medical costs, given the difficulty that patients experience in comparing price and quality for
a professional service such as medical care. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 361 (powell, J., dissenting).
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served as a check on the other party whose interest waS at variance with
it. In other words, even though the doctors' interest may have been in
raising fees, the insurance companies' interest was to keep them as low as
possible. Maricopa's insight, therefore, is that the interaction of the components of the countervailing power can serve to limit the anticompetitive potential. Thus, the countervailing power itself can act as its own
anticompetitive deterrent.
c. Antitrust countervailing restraint evaluations in summary.
In general, countervailing power analysis in antitrust law tells us the
characteristics to look for before making judgments as to a restraint's
legality. The restraint must, of course, contain elements of potential anticompetitiveness for it to come before the Court.201 What creates a
countervailing power phenomenon is that the restraint arises in the face
of a legal concentration of power.202 What should determine legality is
the existence of sufficient market dynamics to render the market fundamentally competitive.203 The countervailing restraint can be created by a
diffuse and powerless group (Appalachian Coals 204 and Topco 205), or by
a third party, either purposely to protect the diffuse group (Chicago
Board of Trade 206) or in its own self-interest (Maricopa 201). The competitiveness of the market can be assured either by the market itself (Chicago Board of Trade 208), by the legal concentration being countervailed
against (Appalachian Coals 209 and Topc0 21O), or by the countervailing
power itself (Maricopa 211).
The competitiveness of the countervailing power scenario, however,
is ultimately possible because it is embedded in a larger atomistic market.
As long as those atomistic forces can exert sufficiently direct effects on
the countervailing power market, even though the countervailing power
market is itself not atomistic, it will still be competitive. In each of the
cases examined, competition was preserved because of the impact of an
atomistic force, either from within the market (Chicago Board of Trade
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra

text accompanying notes 115-41.
text accompanying notes 142-55.
text accompanying notes 166-200.
notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
note 123 and accompanying text.
notes 116-18, 157 and accompanying text.
text accompanying notes 162-66, 192.
text accompanying notes 167-74.
text accompanying notes 183-86.
text accompanying notes 189-90.
text accompanying notes 197-200.
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and TOpCO)212 or from outside of it (Appalachian Coals and Maricopa).213
Thus, in one sense the countervailing power analysis is atomistically
based, as are all other antitrust approaches. 214 But because it permits
restraints that allow market competitors to act in concert, in another
sense it is not.
2. Judicial Treatment ofAttempts to Subvert Countervailing Power.
Not only does countervailing power analysis have the ability to validate
potentially illegal restraints in fundamentally competitive market structures, but it also can guide the Court in condemning efforts by legal concentrations to subvert countervailing efforts that protect vulnerable and
diffuse groups. An example of this phenomenon can be seen in a 1986
unanimous Supreme Court decision. In FTC v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists,21S the legal concentration consisted of dentists who had exclusive access to expert knowledge about the dental procedures needed by
their patients. 216 The patients had little means of determining whether
the procedures recommended by the dentists were necessary or adequate,
and were therefore a vulnerable and diffuse groUp.217
The countervailing power in this case consisted of insurance companies, which insisted that the dentists include x-rays of the patients' teeth
along with their diagnoses. 218 This would allow the insurance companies
to make independent determinations as to whether the recommended
procedures were warranted. 219 The insurance companies' demands could
212. In Chicago Board o/Trade, the market in which the countervailing price rule was enforced
was able to curtail the anticompetitive effects because the market itself was atomistic. In Topco, the
legal concentration (national supermarket chains) could check the anticompetitive potential of the
territorial and customer restrictions because the consumer market in which the national and regional
supermarkets. competed was atomistic.
213. In Appalachian Coals, the price ceilings exerted on the coal agency by the buyer cooperatives stemmed from the competitive forces faced by the buyers in the atomistic consumer market.
Similarly, in Maricopa, the insurance companies also faced the competitive forces of an atomistic
consumer market that induced them to keep doctors' fees low.
214. See supra notes 30-82 and accompanying text.
215. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
216. Id. at 461-62.
217. Id. at 463.
218. Id. at 449. Group dental insurance was relatively new to Indiana and therefore was of a
somewhat experimental nature. The insurance plans typically included two cost-containment provisions: one involving the "predetermination of claims," the other limiting the insurance companies'
obligation to pay benefits only for the "least expensive adequate course of treatment" that was "commonly accepted as providing good dental care." To meet those ends, the insurance companies required that the patient's x-rays be enclosed along with the claim form stating the diagnosis. Indiana
Fed'n of Dentists v. FTC, 745 F.2d 1124, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1984).
219. Indiana Fed'n 0/ Dentists, 476 U.S. at 449; see Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 101 F.T.C. 57, 72
(1983) ("As a result, someone beside the dentist [is] now ... involved in deciding (or at least confirming) a proper treatment plan on which the payment of insurance benefits can fairly be based."),
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be viewed as a means to help patients avoid unnecessary treatment. 220
On the other hand, such requirements could be considered as an effort to
reduce costs by limiting the adequacy of dental care. 221 Either consequence would enable insurance companies to price premiums more competitively. Nevertheless, regardless of what their incentives might have
been, the insurance carriers not only exerted a countervailing restraint on
the dentists' monopoly of knowledge, they also operated in a competitive
framework that would force them to maintain adequate coverage. As the
Court noted, because each company was subject to competition from the
others for the sale of its services, each would have to compete through
quality of care as well as price.222 Thus, collectively, the insurance companies served as their own competitive check on the potential anticompetitive effects (on the kind of dental coverage offered) that might have
arisen from their countervailing activities. Under countervailing power
analysis, therefore, the demand for x-rays would be considered a legal
restraint.
The dentists in the state created a federation and agreed not to send
x-rays to the insurance companies,223 thereby forcing the companies to

220. See Indiana Fed'n ofDentists, 476 U.S. at 449; Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 101 F.T.C. 57, 72
(1983) ("Insurers, naturally anxious to contain dental health care costs, have not generally been

prepared to pay for anything that a dentist recommends. Their covenants to pay dental bills have
commonly been limited to payment of a reasonable charge for work reasonably required.") (footnotes omitted).
221. See Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 463 ("The premise of the [dentists'] argument is
that •.. the provision of x rays will ••. lead to the reduction of costs through the selection of
inadequate treatment.").
222. Although the Court did not formally draw on countervailing power analysis, the reference
in its opinion to the impact of market competition on the insurance companies' restraints is effectively equivalent to that approach:
Insurers deciding what level of care to pay for are not themselves the recipients of those
services, but it is by no means clear that they lack incentives to consider the welfare of the
patient as well as the minimization of costs. They are themselves in competition for the
patronage of the patients ... and must satisfy their potential customers not only that they
will provide coverage at a reasonable cost, but also that coverage will be adequate to meet
their customers' dental needs. There is thus no . . . reason to expect dental insurance
companies to sacrifice quality in return for cost savings ....
Id.
223. Id. at 451.
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undertake far more expensive procedures to make accurate determinations of the need for care.224 Clearly, the dentists' purpose was to undermine the countervailing efforts by the insurance companies,22s although
it is debatable whether under traditional antitrust analyses the dentists'
conduct was illegal.
Under the Modem Populist analysis, adopted by the Federal Trade
Commission,226 the dentists' agreement could be viewed as a per se illegal
group boycott and a concerted refusal to deal. 227 Under a Chicago
School approach, adopted by the Seventh Circuit to uphold the rule,228
224. Id. at 456. The Indiana Federation of Dentists claimed that its purpose in refusing to send
x-rays was to preserve the quality of medical care for its patients by forcing the insurance companies
to consider the patients' entire dental history, and not the x-rays alone, before reaching any conclusions as to the benefits to be paid. The only means to do this that the Federation would allow,
however, was to require the insurance companies to send their own dentists to the offices of the
patients' dentists and examine the patients' records there, creating prohibitively high costs to any
independent assessment of a dentist's recommended course of treatment. Indiana Fed'n 0/ Dentists,
745 F.2d at 1129-30; see also Indiana Fed'n 0/ Dentists, 101 F.T.C. at 84:
[T]here is unchallenged testimony in this record to the eITect that it is not economically
feasible and in any event it would be a terrible waste of time to have insurers' professional
dental consultants constantly travelling from office to office to talk to dentists (when available) and look at their X-rays.
225. The court recognized the dentists' purpose:
The economic interest of dentists in not being 'second-guessed' by their patients' insurers is
too plain to need elaboration. The experience of dental health insurers-who, of course,
have their own bias-has been that correcting the treatment plans submitted by dentists in
Indiana almost always means slimming them down rather than beefing them up. Experience shows that an alternate benefits clause is a significant cost-containing mechanism.
This is not to say that any large number of dentists deliberately set out to defraud
whomever is paying the bill. But where a range of opinion is possible it is not surprising for
dentists and bill-payers to have honest disagreements of opinion as to how much dental
work is really required in a particular instance. That eeonomic conflict constitutes the
background of this case.
Indiana Fed'n 0/ Dentists, 101 F.T.C. at 72-73 (footnotes omitted).
226. See id.
227. The FTC initially looked only to the agreement itself, see id. at 84 ("As a practical matter,
we find that Paragraph 5 of the Manual amounts to a plan by IDA for Indiana dentists to boycott
insurers."), without considering any market factors. It focused primarily on the conspiratorial and
concerted natnre of the action, see id. at 92 ("[T]he foregoing passages clearly evidence a plan to
mobilize Indiana's dentists into an 'evangelistic brigade': brandishing a collective, not an individual
refusal to dcal with the insurers serving the state.") (footnote omitted), and noted its extent and
eITectiveness, see id. at 93-124. It concluded that the dentists' action VIas a concerted refusal to deal
and a group boycott and therefore per se illegal. See id. at 124, 127. The FTC acknowledged,
however, that the law was still unsettled as to what extent professional organizations were exempt
from strict per se applications of the rnle against group boycotts and concerted refusals to deal and,
therefore, might come instead under a rule of reason scrutiny. See id. at 125-26. But the administrative body concluded that even under a rule of reason analysis, the Indiana Federation of Dentists'
activities should still be condemned: first, because there were no procompetitive eITects oITered to
oITset the anticompetitive eITects; and second, the preservation of health care argument, which the
commission considered a noncompetitive aspect, was not real and was the result of "overly broad
'ethical principles'" that should be disregarded. See id. at 126-27.
228. See Indiana Fed'n 0/ Dentists, 745 F.2d at 1139.
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the dentists' activity could be legal because the evidence failed to preclude the possibility that the Indiana Federation of Dentists lacked market power229 or that the dentists would still compete with each other
regarding insurance coverage in spite of the restraint. 230 The Chicago
School analysis would dictate that if a judicial assessment cannot exclude
the possibility that the restraint has no impact on the market and therefore no anticompetitive effects, then the practice should not be held in
violation of the Sherman Act. 231
The Supreme Court, using a Modem Market analysis, condemned
the dentists' actions. 232 First it noted that there were no procompetitive
229. The Seventh Circuit pointed out that the dentists might be subject to competitive forces
from surrounding areas that would make their markets contestable. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 745
F.2d at 1141-42. For a general discussion of contestable market theory, see supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
230. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 745 F.2d at 1141. Typical of a Chicago School approach, the
Seventh Circuit panel looked to see if any evidence would support the conclusion that the conduct
under question should be upheld. The court first found that the dentists' agreement could not be
characterized as a group boycott or a concerted refusal to deal because the dentists ultimately allowed the insurance companies to come to their offices for evaluations. See id. at 1138. Then, under
a rule of reason approach, the Seventh Circuit chose to apply a market analysis rather than examine
the nature of the agreement itself to determine the anticompetitive effect of the dentists' conduct.
See id. at 1138-40. The panel decided that because evidence showed that the member dentists still
treated patients covered by the group health insurance policies and permitted in-office reviews of
their work, and that the dentists still competed among themselves with regard to their cooperation
with the group insurers, therefore the restraint could not be eliminating that competition. See id. at
1143. Finally, the court concluded that the evidence fell far short of proving that the -member dentists had sufficient market power effectively to alter it, in spite of strong indications that the Indiana
Federation of Dentists comprised 95% of the dentists in the region. The court argued that the FTC
had failed to consider other sources of competition that would affeet the membership. See id. at
1142. Although, like the F.T.C., the Seventh Circuit did not find any procompetitive effects from
the activity, the court gave substantially more weight to the dentists' argument that their purpose
was to preserve quality of care. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's analysis was consistent with the Chicago
School approach: It engaged in a market analysis rather than focusing on the nature of the conduct
itself, and it considered whether output could be successfully restrained by acknowledging the possibility that the dentists were subject to competition from sources other than themselves. Upon finding no anticompetitive effect from these examinations, the court concluded that the practice should
be upheld. For a general discussion of the Chicago School approach, see supra notes 73-82 and
accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 73·82, 229 and accompanying text. In effect, this stringent standard is very
similar to the one created by the Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465
U.S. 752 (1984), in which the Court held that to find a concerted action between manufacturer and
dealer, U[t]here must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and
nonterminated distributors were acting independently." Id. at 764 (emphasis added). Although
such a strict standard may be appropriate when questioning the termination by a manufacturer of
one of its dealers when the manufacturer is subjeet to significant interbrand competition, it is arguable whether the standard is appropriate in the Indiana Federation of Dentists case given traditional
antitrust concerns.
232. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465 (1986). The Supreme Court dismissed for several reasons the Seventh Circuit's arguments for concluding that competition among
dentists for cooperation with third party insurers was not foreclosed. In addition to "common sense
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dimensions to the dentists' agreement. 233 The Court asserted that the
dentists' efforts to disrupt the market for quality of services was
equivalent to interfering with the functioning of the price-setting mechanism itself.234 In each case, the result would have been prices that were
higher because of the dentists' agreement. Thus, by engaging in a rule of
reason analysis that included a sophisticated economic assessment of the
restriction's market impact, the Modern Market Court found the dentists' activities to be an illegal restraint oftrade.235 Through the opinions
of three adjudicating bodies-the Federal Trade Commission, the Seventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court-we see once again how, under
traditional antitrust principles, the legality of the rule depends on the
philosophy guiding the deciding tribunal.
Although the countervailing power analysis would reach the same
result that the Supreme Court did in Indiana Federation of Dentists, its
reasoning would be premised on different principles. Countervailing
power analysis would find the insurance companies' efforts a countervailing power because it protected a diffuse, powerless group from a legal
concentration that exploited that groUp.236 The analysis would also determine that the insurance companies' restraints were legal because the
restraint was subject to competitive forces that would limit any anticompetitive effect.237

It is evident in Indiana Federation of Dentists that the countervailing power enhances competition and promotes social welfare. Therefore, in addition to upholding those kinds of restraints, countervailing
power analysis would also suggest that efforts by the legal concentration

and economic theory" dictating support for the finding that competition was in fact restrained, Justice White found the factual evidence OVerwhelming that there was an effective concerted refusal to
deal with the insurance companies. See id. at 456. In particular, he noted the ease with which the
insurance companies obtained the x-rays in regions where the Indiana Federation of Dentists did not
operate. The Court also found unpersuasive the lower court's assertion that competition was not
foreclosed by the agreement because the member dentists ultimately made the x-rays available to the
insurance companies, albeit under more costly circumstances. See id. at 455-57. After rejecting the
Seventh Circuit's Chicago School analysis, Justice White proceeded to evaluate whether the practice
was an unreasonable restraint of trade under Modem Market guidelines.
233. See id. at 459. The Court's observation on this point was consistent with those of the
Seventh Circuit and of the Federal Trade Commission. See supra notes 225, 228.
234. See Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459.
235. Because it found no procompetitive impact, the Court avoided the Modem Market's tendency to uphold the practice automatically whenever such effects were found. The Court was therefore able to employ the more balanced aspects of the Modem Market approach and find the
restrictions on x-ray submissions anticompetitive.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 154-65.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 166-200.
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to undermine the impact of the countervailing restraint should be condemned. Although the Supreme Court seemed to recognize this intuitively in Indiana Federation o/Dentists, its approach does not ensure that
similar countervailing power scenarios will be treated the same way in
the future. Only if there is a conscious application of countervailing
power analysis will such conclusions be reached consistently.
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE VALUE OF COUNTERVAILING POWER
ANALYSIS

Given the potential anticompetitive aspects of countervailing power
restraints, one might ask why they should be permitted merely because
competition can still be assured in their presence. Countervailing power
restraints arise, however, to preserve and enhance competition and social
welfare that would otherwise be diminished.
In Chicago Board 0/ Trade, for example, given the lack of control
over the time of delivery to the Chicago area, grain sellers might have
gone to other markets if the price rule were not imposed. 238 The resulting reduction in the competitiveness of the Chicago market would have
adversely affected those consumers who relied on it. In Appalachian
Coals, the price to the coal miners was so low without tl1e agency that
some coal miners were being driven out of business,239 decreasing the
number of sellers who could compete in tl1e marketplace. In Topco, if
the regional chains could not effectively compete with the national
chains, they also might have been driven out of business,240 resulting in
reduced competition among supermarkets and higher prices for consumers.241 In Maricopa, the countervailing power arrangement would ultimately lower prices for patients242 and enable tl1em to consume more
medical services, which would produce all expansion of output and an
increase in social welfare. Given the improvements in society'S economic
well-being that countervailing power brings about, those restraintswhen embedded in a sufficiently competitive environment-should not be
barred by antitrust law.
Countervailing power analysis is also valuable because it p~ovides a
legal basis for courts to permit economic responses by exploited groups
that are tailored to the anticompetitive aspects of otherwise legal behavior. If we relied solely on the courts to redress the problematic aspects of
the legal concentration, the legal response would likely be inadequate or
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
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Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239·40 (1918).
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 364 (1933).
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overly broad. Either the courts would hold the concentration legal and
therefore beyond the reach of antitrust laws, or they would attempt to
carve out a rule to regulate the troublesome conduct and declare it illegal. The latter approach has the potential of overinvalidation because
legal rules barring conduct tend to be insensitive to the particulars of a
given economic situation. Because countervailing power restraints arise
in response to a specific economic problem, they are inherently focused,
and efficiently address only the problematic behavior. 243 Because legal
countervailing power restraints are by definition operating competitively,
there is no risk of overly broad effects stemming from them. Thus, countervailing power and countervailing power analysis fill a vacuum in economics and law. The countervailing power responds to an economic
vacuum created by a legal concentration of power, and countervailing
power analysis provides missing guidelines for the Court to permit such
conduct when consistent with antitrust goals.
Finally, countervailing power analysis should appeal to all the antitrust philosophies currently represented on the Court. It clearly promotes competition and efficiency, which are the primary concerns of both
the Modern Market and the Chicago Schools. It should also appeal to
the Chicago School because it allows more economic behavior to be declared legal. In addition, because it permits distributive justice, that is,
access to industrial profits by a larger number of market participants, it
should appeal to the Modern Populist School.
Countervailing power analysis provides a new direction for the legal
use of economic reasoning in antitrust law. It perurits the Court to
broaden its focus beyond particular conduct and allows it to use economic theory that exploits the full power of economic reasoning. As a
result, the effectiveness of judicial scrutiny is enhanced through the process of tying evaluations of business conduct to the contexts in which
they operate.

243. Judge Easterbrook discusses the comparative advantage that markets have over jUdicial
rulings in correcting anticompetitive aspects of business conduct in Easterbrook, supra note 57. The
question is, of course, when can we rely on the market to do so? Countervailing power analysis
identifies well-defined circumstances in whieh we can trust the marketplace to remedy an economic
barrier. The Chicago School approach tends to lean on a more unconditional faith in marketplace
corrections per se, as reflected in Judge Easterbrook's essay.

